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This dissertation deals with the macroeconomic implications of fiscal policy in small
open economies with a particular emphasis on emerging economies. I use both em-
pirical and theoretical approaches to distinguish key di↵erence in the design of fiscal
policy between emerging and developed economies. I also analyze the macroeconomic
consequences of di↵erences in the conduct of fiscal policy. Thus, the dissertation is
focused on the interplay between fiscal policy and business cycle dynamics. Recent
policy challenges in developed economies, such as monetary authorities grappling
with the zero lower bound on short run nominal rates and fiscal stimulus packages
emerging as an important policy tool, have sparked renewed academic interest in the
topic of fiscal policy and business cycles. Institutional and macroeconomic features
in emerging economies make the macroeconomic aspects of fiscal policy an important
research agenda and one to which this dissertation contributes.
A number of papers have documented fiscal policy pro cyclicality in terms of stronger
co-movement between government expenditure and macroeconomic fundamentals in
emerging and developing economies. This feature of the data raises a 2 important
questions: 1) does fiscal policy reinforce the macroeconomic cycle in these countries
leading to a heighten macroeconomic volatility (“when it rains, it pours”), and 2)
is the fiscal stance in these economies due to unique macroeconomic features or is
it the consequence of institutional and political imperfections? The first chapter,
titled “When it rains, it pours”: fiscal policy, credit constraints and business cycles
in emerging and developed economies, sets out to answer these questions by compar-
atively studying a group of developed and emerging economies. I estimate a panel
structural vector autoregressive model to investigate if government consumption ex-
penditure responds more pro cyclically to fundamentals and what role international
financial conditions play for the fiscal stance and for the volatility of the cycle in
emerging economies relative to developed. My findings suggest the response to out-
put fluctuations is not systematically di↵erent in emerging governments relative to
developed economies’. However, emerging governments curtail spending in response
to increases in the sovereign borrowing rate which forces their consumption expendi-
ture to act more pro cyclically. I find evidence of higher fiscal discretion in emerging
economies. However, the e cacy of government consumption expenditure is substan-
tially lower in emerging economies than in developed. Thus fiscal policy ends up
being responsible for a lower share of business cycle volatility in emerging economies
than in developed.
In the second chapter, titled Estimating the Dynamics of Fiscal Financing in Emerg-
ing Economies, I propose a strategy for estimating the government financing rule for
an emerging economy. The estimation uses the structural VAR impulse responses ob-
tained in the previous chapter to discipline the parameters of a small open economy
real business cycle model with a public sector. The parameters can be split into two
groups: those influencing the e↵ectiveness of fiscal policy (i.e the multiplier MGY ) and
the parameters governing the financing of the exogenous stream of government con-
sumption. The empirical response to interest rate shocks puts restrictions on the first
group of parameters governing the size of the multiplier. The empirical response to
a government consumption shock can be used to obtain estimates of the fiscal policy
rule. I construct a model with a role for both interest rate shocks and government
consumption shocks. A natural estimation approach in this case is impulse response
matching.
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Chapter 1
“When it rains, it pours”: fiscal
policy, credit constraints and
business cycles in emerging and
developed economies
1.1 Introduction
The empirical international finance literature has long emphasized excess volatility
that business cycles in emerging and poor economies exhibit. Relative to the devel-
oped world, these economies have higher volatility of all aggregate demand compo-
nents as well as more frequent and deeper crises (Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe (2017)).
Another strand of research sheds light on the tendency of fiscal policy to be pro-
cyclical in these economies. This paper explores the relationship between these two
stylized facts. In particular, I study the question of business cycle volatility in emerg-
ing economies through the lens of the “when it rains, it pours” phenomenon. Dubbed
so by Kaminsky et al. (2004), this is a situation in which recessions are reinforced by
1
capital outflows coupled with a pro-cyclical policy stance.1 Kaminsky et al. (2004)
among others2 document that while in general net capital flows are pro-cyclical across
poor, emerging and developed economies, the cyclicality of (fiscal) policy variables dif-
fers between the developing and developed group. In particular, developing economies
exhibit fiscal policy pro-cyclicality which is di cult to justify as a policy prescription.3
This paper aims to uncover the reasons for and the consequences of fiscal pro-
cyclicality. On one hand, policymakers themselves could be the source of volatility
through discretionary interventions. On the other hand, it is reasonable to expect
that policymakers in the developing and emerging world face constraints which impede
their role as insurers against macroeconomic volatility. International borrowing costs
have been emphasized as important drivers of business cycle fluctuations in emerging
economies. Finally, even if policy itself does not cause or contribute to macroeco-
nomic volatility, the same policy design will lead to di↵erent outcomes both in terms
of policy and private sector variables when the underlying macro shocks are di↵erent.
In short we want to ask whether the macroeconomic woes of these economies are
self-induced or the result of more volatile underlying shocks, coupled with potentially
tighter constraints faced by these governments. If the latter is true, we also want to
know if the excess volatility originates at home through a more volatile process for
1Kaminsky et al. (2004) explore both fiscal and monetary policy cyclicality among developing,
emerging and developed countries. This paper focuses on fiscal policy although as a natural contin-
uation the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy as well as exchange rate policy is to be
considered.
2see Talvi and Vegh (2005), Gavin and Perotti (1997).
3The term pro-cyclicality itself requires a careful definition. As emphasized by Kaminsky et al.
(2004), perhaps the most convenient measure to use to identify potential di↵erences in the conduct
of fiscal policy is government expenditure as opposed to revenue and primary balance in levels
and as a share of GDP. In terms of government expenditure, fiscal pro-cyclicality is defined as a
positive co-movement between government expenditure and GDP. Other researchers have defined
pro-cyclicality in terms of taxes: the government raises tax rates in recessions. Direct evidence on
tax rates is sparse so researchers have used government revenue statistics and anecdotal evidence to
make the case for fiscal pro-cyclicality in developing economies. Finally, primary balance statistics
highlight that fiscal outcomes are di↵erent for the developing world but they are hard to use to
disentangle the causes behind those results.
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GDP, for example, or abroad through asset price shocks. In this context, I try to
assess what fraction of business cycle fluctuations can be attributed to sovereign rate
shocks versus policy shocks.
In order to understand the causes behind the “when it rains, it pours” phenomenon,
I estimate a panel SVAR on a large group of developed and emerging economies. I
focus on government consumption expenditure as the fiscal policy variable with the
largest cross-country data availability. The analysis has to overcome the issues of en-
dogeneity between 1) fiscal policy and fundamentals 2) international borrowing cost
and fundamentals and 3) international borrowing cost and fiscal policy. A number of
papers have emphasized the feedback between fundamentals and borrowing costs for
emerging economies.4 Fiscal policy variables also both respond to and influence the
state of the economy. Finally, fluctuations in the price of externally traded sovereign
debt put a constraint on policymakers’ ability to use fiscal policy for stabilization.
There are several pass-through channels for a sovereign interest rate shock to influ-
ence the cycle. First, if government spending contracts in response to increases in
the borrowing cost, there is a standard multiplier e↵ect which decreases output and
a↵ects investment and consumption contingent on wealth e↵ects and the strength of
Ricardian equivalence. Second, the government might shift part of the debt burden
domestically thus crowding out investment and consumption. Finally, rising sovereign
rates can a↵ect the private economy if interest rate shocks pass through to house-
holds and firms via the banking sector.5 In order to shed light on these questions,
the analysis needs to isolate orthogonal shocks to policy variables, fundamentals and
international borrowing costs. Although fiscal pro-cyclicality is normally discussed
in the context of emerging and developing economies, the European debt crisis made
4see Uribe and Yue (2006), Mendoza and Yue (2012).
5see De Marco (forthcoming) for quantifying government debt distress pass-through to firm loans
in the context of developed economies and Arteta and Hale (2008) in the context of emerging
economies.
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the interaction between fiscal policy, government finances and the real economy a
relevant issue for developed economies as well. In contrast to much of the literature,
this paper studies both developed and emerging economies. I compare the behavior
and the e↵ect of government consumption spending across the two groups. I also
characterize the e↵ect of sovereign rate shocks on government consumption spending
as well as their direct and indirect e↵ect on private sector variables.
My identification strategy combines the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) SVAR approach
to identify fiscal shocks and Uribe and Yue (2006) identification of external borrowing
cost shocks. The methodology proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) uses insti-
tutional knowledge to put constraints on the impact matrix in a VAR analysis. In
particular, the identification scheme assumes that discretionary fiscal responses take
place with one period delay. The use of quarterly data is essential for implementing
this identification strategy. For the purpose of identifying external borrowing costs,
Uribe and Yue (2006) propose an ordering of the impact matrix which leads to im-
pulse responses consistent with the standard small open economy real business cycle
model (SOE RBC). The current study o↵ers a unified framework for considering the
interactions among fundamentals, fiscal policy shocks and external financial condi-
tions.6Apart from the variables commonly included in the analysis, I also consider
the interplay among the government response function, the dependence of spreads on
both aggregate conditions and the government policy stance. This approach allows
6Another strategy for identifying the e↵ect of fiscal policy changes at business cycle frequency
is the narrative approach advocated by Romer and Romer (2010) among others. The narrative ap-
proach uses information contained in government documents and announcements to identify periods
of fiscal expansion or consolidation which are unrelated to the business cycle. The identification pro-
cedure which uses military build up in wartime to identify government spending episodes unrelated
to the business cycle is a special case of the narrative approach. Examples of this approach used on
U.S data include Barro (1981), Hall (1986), Hall (2009), Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), Barro and
Redlick (2011). As military build-up episodes are not common during the same time as most detailed
macroeconomic data is available for the developing world, I adhere to the SVAR identification ap-
proach to estimate the policy reaction function and the government spending multiplier.Sheremirov
and Spirovska (2017) exploit a new military spending database to estimate multipliers for a large
number of countries. Despite the di↵erence in identification, our estimates are in line.
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me to retrieve estimates of the policy response function to output and international
borrowing costs as well as the coe cients on the government debt pricing function.
I also trace out the dynamic e↵ect of orthogonal shocks to income, sovereign yields
and government spending.
My findings suggest that government consumption, a category of government expen-
diture, is pro-cyclical for both emerging and developed economies. The systematic
response of both types of economies to output fluctuations is virtually the same.
Emerging economies are however more sensitive for changes in international bor-
rowing conditions. Higher output relaxes international borrowing constraints. As a
result, GDP shocks lead to an overall bigger increase in government consumption in
emerging economies. This finding suggests that as far as government consumption is
concerned, increases in this fiscal expenditure component during good times are not
symptomatic of political frictions. Instead, the higher fiscal pro-cyclicality in emerg-
ing economies is the result of these governments being more sensitive to international
borrowing conditions. However, the analysis reveals that discretionary interventions
are much more common in the emerging world. This raises concerns because a higher
degree of policy discretion has been shown to have a negative e↵ect on long run growth
and volatility.
I investigate the di↵erential role of international financial conditions for policy and
business cycle outcomes of emerging and developed economies along two dimensions:
shocks to the international safe borrowing rate and shocks to the price of a country’s
government debt on international markets. Fluctuations in the safe rate have a neg-
ligible impact on the business cycle and the fiscal stance in either group of countries.
Shocks to the government borrowing rate have di↵erent implications for the developed
versus the emerging group. An exogenous increase in the sovereign rate is contrac-
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tionary in both economies. In the emerging group these shocks are more important
for output fluctuations, while in the developed group they matter relatively more for
investment dynamics.
My results also shed light on the e cacy of government consumption as a policy tool.
The estimated long run multiplier e↵ect of government consumption on output is less
than 1 for both country groups. However, the government consumption multiplier
is twice as high for the developed group, pointing to a substantially impaired ability
of government consumption shocks to influence the economy in emerging countries.
My results also imply that government consumption expenditure shocks account for
a smaller fraction of business cycle fluctuations in emerging economies. Despite the
high volatility of these shocks in the emerging world, they claim a smaller share of
the volatility of macroeconomic variables because of the smaller multiplier. Shocks to
government consumption also account for a smaller share of the sovereign rate fluc-
tuations emphasizing the fact that these governments have been more careful about
international borrowing conditions. The paper provides estimates based on the of-
ficially reported economic activity. Informality is currently outside the scope of the
study.
In this paper I also document di↵erences in fiscal statistics and their relationship with
the cycle among a large group of poor, emerging and rich countries. I highlight that
in terms of correlations to the cycle, government expenditure is pro-cyclical in poor
and emerging economies as stressed in the literature. It is important however to look
at individual components of government expenditure as this is a fairly large category
which encompasses all of government expense as well as investment (Table 1.1). When
focusing specifically on government consumption of goods and services, I find that
this fiscal expenditure category is pro-cyclical across the board with group di↵erences
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stemming from higher volatility of government consumption rather than cyclicality.
The SVAR analysis currently focuses on government consumption expenditure. As
confirmed by summary statistics the distinction among di↵erent components of gov-
ernment expenditure is important. Government consumption expenditure is only one
component of automatic stabilization. Therefore, lack of other automatic stabiliz-
ers (e.g. social transfers (unemployment benefits, safety-net program), retirement
and health benefits, progressive taxes and proportional taxes) in emerging economies
might be behind the di↵erence in government expenditure cyclicality.7
Recent policy challenges in developed economies, such as monetary authorities grap-
pling with the zero lower bound on short run nominal rates and fiscal stimulus pack-
ages emerging as an important policy tool, have sparked renewed academic interest
in the topic of fiscal policy and business cycles. In the next section I discuss how
this paper relates to several branches of the literature: discretionary fiscal policy, po-
litical frictions and macroeconomic outcomes, cost of borrowing and business cycles,
external shocks and macroeconomic volatility. Section 1.3 describes the sources and
construction of the dataset used in the paper. Section 1.4 describes the behavior
of key fiscal variables across poor, emerging and developed economies. Section 1.5
discusses the SVAR methodology while section 1.6 discusses the empirical results.
Section 1.7 and section 1.8 focus on the variance and the variance decomposition of
estimated shocks. Section 1.9 presents robustness checks which extend the analysis
to subsets of the data or employ an alternative estimation strategy. Section 1.10
concludes.
7McKay and Reis (2016) provide model-based estimates of the ability of US built-in stabilizers
to decrease consumption and output volatility. They find that the social insurance role (the tax-
and-transfer system) of stabilizers is more important than the New Keynesian demand stabilization
channel.
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1.2 Links to the Literature
The vast majority of the studies on discretionary fiscal policy are conducted on US
and to a lesser extent OECD data. Using US data and a VAR approach, Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) estimate a government spending multiplier around 1; Fatas and
Mihov (2001) obtain estimates well above 1 while Mountford and Uhlig (2009) find
large debt financed tax multipliers but low government spending multipliers for the
US. Based on the narrative approach, Ramey (2011) finds a wide range of multipliers
for the US including estimates above 1 depending on the time period.8,9
There is a nascent literature on quantifying the e↵ects of fiscal policy outside devel-
oped economies. The influential paper by Ilzetzki et al. (2013) sets the beginning of
an exciting strand of research by o↵ering the first cross-country comparison of gov-
ernment consumption multipliers that spans poor, emerging and developed country
groups. Jawadi et al. (2016) focuses explicitly on emerging economies and estimates
a PVAR on the BRICs. Jawadi et al. (2016) find strong New Keynesian e↵ects of
government purchase shocks; they also find evidence of monetary accommodation
8Although the government spending multiplier emerges as a convenient statistic to describe the
e cacy of discretionary changes in fiscal policy, there are three important channels government
spending and government revenue shocks influence economic activity: 1) the e↵ect of fiscal policy
on the composition of GDP (private consumption and investment), 2) the e↵ect on asset prices such
as stocks and housing markets 3) the e↵ect on the external sector. The question of whether private
consumption increases in response to a positive government spending shock has been investigated at
length by both the theoretical and the empirical literature. From a theoretical standpoint Gali et al.
(2007) shows in the context of a New Keynesian model that breaking the Ricardian equivalence is
essential for getting consumption to respond positively to an expansion in government spending.
Gali et al. (2007) among many others consider the presence of hand-to-mouth consumers to decrease
the negative wealth e↵ect of present or future increase in taxes to finance the fiscal consumption
which is responsible for the fall in consumption in the standard New Keynesian and neoclassical
model. O↵setting the fall in consumption also leads to a higher output multiplier potentially above
1.
9Non-linearities in the e↵ect of fiscal policy have been emphasized by the literature. Perotti
(1999) finds that government spending decreases private consumption in debt-stressed economies.
There is some evidence in the literature that composition of government expenditure matters for the
value of the multipliers. Abiad et al. (2016) public investment increases output and employment in
both the short and long run in advanced economies especially during periods of slack; the e↵ect on
investment has the opposite sign depending on the state of the economy with an expansionary e↵ect
during periods of low output.
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in these economies raising concerns about monetary authority independence for this
group. 10 The present study contributes to this strand of literature by comparing the
design of fiscal policy across country groups in addition to the more commonly dis-
cussed fiscal multipliers. My particular focus is the importance of external borrowing
costs for shaping the conduct of fiscal policy. Having estimates of the government
response function allows me to quantify the extent to which the response of emerging
governments to output fluctuations is di↵erent from that of developed. The compar-
ison is a test for the existence of political frictions in emerging economies relative to
developed. In terms of the government consumption multiplier, my results for the
group of countries in my dataset are in line with those in Ilzetzki et al. (2013), partic-
ularly in the sense that higher level of development makes fiscal policy more e↵ective.
One important question I set out to answer is whether observed di↵erences in fis-
cal outcomes between emerging and developed countries stem from political frictions
or whether they can be explained from a purely macroeconomic perspective. Woo
(2009) and Ilzetzki (2011) motivate pro-cyclicality in government expenditure with
political and social polarization. In these papers political underrepresentation or
institutional infighting about the types of public good to be provided makes govern-
ment expenditure more sensitive to revenue fluctuations. Frankel et al. (2012) relate
government expenditure pro-cyclicality to lack of good institutions and find empir-
ical evidence that improving the soundness of institutions helps the pro-cyclicality
issue. Alesina and Tabellini (2008) propose a model of political agency problem to
explain why more corrupt governments fail to insure e ciently private consumption.
10Another point of interest concerning the international dimensions of fiscal policy relates to the
Mertens and Ravn (2011) focus on the real exchange depreciation puzzle in response to government
expenditure shock present in developed countries’ data. While output and consumption rise and
the trade balance deteriorates in response to a government expenditure shock in these economies,
the real exchange rate is empirically found to depreciate. The authors rationalize the depreciation
through a model featuring deep habits in both private and public consumption and the decrease in
mark-ups due to the increase in government consumption demand.
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In their model public outlays rise in response to an expansionary income shock. These
expansions in government spending are due to governments extracting higher rents
when times are good. Overall models based on political frictions predict that gov-
ernment expenditures are more sensitive to output and revenue fluctuations relative
to the e cient benchmark. The SVAR analysis presented in this paper suggests that
emerging governments are indeed more sensitive to fundamentals, but in the sense of
international borrowing constraints and not shocks to domestic income. Therefore,
external borrowing costs seem to be more important in shaping fiscal policy design
in emerging economies than political frictions.
International credit conditions have been emphasized in the literature on emerging
economies business cycles as an important source of uncertainty. Models which allow
credit frictions to a↵ect directly not only consumption smoothing but also labor de-
mand have been shown to deliver properties consistent with stylized facts.11,12Given
this evidence, it comes as no surprise that international credit markets and financial
frictions have been among the suspected reasons for fiscal pro-cyclicality in emerg-
ing markets. Riascos and Vegh (2003) and Cuadra et al. (2010) propose models to
justify why taxes on consumption in the former case and labor income taxes in the
latter case might behave pro-cyclically when the international asset markets are in-
complete or when premiums on government debt are determined a la Arellano (2008)
respectively. In terms of pro-cyclicality on the expenditure side, Mendoza and Oviedo
(2006) show that a government which faces a more volatile revenue stream sets lower
debt limits for itself. Bi (2012) o↵ers an alternative explanation; it is the volatility of
11see for instance Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Mendoza and Yue (2012).
12Uribe and Yue (2006) and Akinci (2013) present a PVAR analysis of a group of emerging
economies and find that the estimated impulse responses of fundamentals are consistent with the
theoretical impulse responses arising from a model with a working capital constraint. Uribe and
Yue (2006) find that international capital markets a↵ect emerging economies through risk premium
shocks and to much lesser extent through shocks to the global risk-free rate. Akinci (2013) shows
that shocks to international risk appetites are another source of variation which can cause business
cycle slumps in the emerging world.
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government expenditure that leads to lower debt limits.13 The current paper strives
to o↵er a unified approach for measuring interactions between internal fundamentals,
external shocks and government expenditure.
This paper also contributes to the literature on measuring the role of external shocks
for business cycle fluctuation in emerging and developing economies.14 Raddatz
(2007) estimates the e↵ect of external shocks emanating from commodity price fluc-
tuations, natural disasters and the international economy on low income and poor
economies and finds that external shocks are responsible for only a small share of
output fluctuation in this group of economies. My conclusions are similar in regard
to international sovereign rate shocks. I find that these shocks are more contrac-
tionary in emerging economies and account for a bigger share of output fluctuations.
Nonetheless the overall share of business cycle fluctuations they account for is small.
1.3 Data
As the identification strategy for government consumption shocks hinges on the use
of quarterly data, I compile a data set of quarterly output, investment, net trade
and government consumption expenditure for a panel of emerging and developed
economies. I use government consumption because among the components of total
government expenditure it has the best cross-country availability at quarterly fre-
quency. The data sources are IMF IFS and Eurostat. All series are deflated using
the series specific price index when available or the Producer Price Index. Data are
13In the model in Bi (2012) government expenditure alternates between a stationary and a non
stationary process with an exogenous probability.
14Using a BVAR analysis, Erten (2012) finds that external demand shocks accounted for roughly
50% of the variation in GDP growth for a sample of Latin American economies during the European
debt crisis.
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deseasoned and linearly detrended. 15
To measure the external borrowing cost faced by the sovereign, I use the J.P.Morgan
Emerging Market Bond Index Plus (EMBI+)16 for emerging economies and the
J.P.Morgan Government Bond Index (GBI) series for developed economies. Both
indices are constructed by J.P.Morgan as a representative investment benchmark for
a country’s internationally traded sovereign debt and thus are a good proxy for how
international investors price sovereign debt. Both indices cover debt instruments de-
nominated in US dollars and span all available maturities. To proxy for the safe rate,
I follow the rest of the literature and use the 10-year US treasury yield. In order to
obtain measures of real return on government debt, I adjust both the sovereign yields
and the safe rate by US expected inflation, which is proxied by a four-quarter rolling
average of the US CPI. I obtain the quarterly GBI and EMBI+ as well as the 10-year
US treasury series from Thomson Reuters Datastream.
The inclusion of countries in my dataset is guided by the coverage of the two sovereign
bond indices- EMBI+ and GBI. The inclusion of a country in either index implies that
it is viewed by international financial markets as belonging to either group. Therefore
I can use the time series for these countries to measure how international investors
price sovereign debt and to quantify group di↵erence in that respect. Following the
groups delineated by the two sovereign bond indices, I included the following coun-
tries in my analysis: 1) developed economies : Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, HK, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK; 2) emerging economies : Argentina, Brazil, Bul-
garia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, Turkey,
15Similar results obtain if I detrend the data quadratically.
16According to the J.P.Morgan documentation provided by Datastream the EMBI+ contains only
bonds or loans issued by sovereign entities form index-eligible countries.
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Ukraine.17 As a robustness check I also report results excluding the distressed Euro-
pean economies from the sample. The time series length for each panel is determined
by the coverage of the sovereign bond indices. The beginning of the indices also
roughly coincides with the beginning of the time series on government consumption
for emerging economies. The resulting time series length is Q1 1994 to Q4 2014. My
panel comprises a total of 30 countries and 84 quarters.
The annual data on fiscal variables is drawn from the IMF WEO. It covers the time
period from 1980 to 2014 for 168 countries. The advantage of the annual data is the
wider country and fiscal variable coverage relative to what is available at the quarterly
frequency. I use this data to revisit the problem of fiscal pro-cyclicality and to verify
if the pattern of greater procyclicality is present beyond the late 1990s as emphasized
by the previous literature.
1.4 Pro-cyclicality at Annual Frequency
As a first stab at the data, I take a look at the annual series to determine if the
pro-cyclicality of government expenditure and government consumption for emerging
and developing economies characterizes the data once the sample is extended with
recent data. I find that government expenditure does behave di↵erently between rich
economies and the rest. Figure 1.1 shows the contemporaneous correlation between
the cyclical component of real GDP and real government expenditure. I calculate
the group specific correlation using both data series in levels and in first di↵erence
to alleviate concerns about stationarity. I also summarize the group specific distri-
bution in terms of a simple as well as a population weighted mean. Additionally, I
provide a check by netting out interest payments from total expenditure. Because we
17I drop Croatia (15 quarters), Egypt (25 quarters), Hungary (14 quarters), Indonesia (32 quar-
ters), Poland (51 quarters), Malaysia (12 quarters) as they were included in the EMBI+ for fewer
than 15 years.
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should anticipate that the composition and the yield curve of sovereign debt di↵ers
among the three country groups, interest payments might be confounding the degree
of pro-cyclicality. 18 Across the board the correlation is di↵erent from 0 with the
exception of the case of rich economies in levels. Overall there is strong evidence that
government expenditure is pro-cyclical for the emerging and the poor group relative
to the rich group. As the t tests suggest the correlation is indistinguishable between
emerging and poor but the rich group is significantly di↵erent from the rest in terms
of the cyclicality of government expenditure. The exception is the case for the popula-
tion weighted correlation. In this case the poor group shows the most counter-cyclical
stance. The population weights emphasize India and China for which the correlation
is negative. As Figure 1.3 shows pro-cyclicality is decreasing in country size for poor
and emerging, but particularly so for poor. I report population weighted correlations
excluding India and China. In this case the pro-cyclicality pattern emerges again.
Figure 1.2 reports the volatilities among the 3 groups. As the literature has em-
phasized, the cycle is at least 50% more volatile for poor and emerging economies
than for industrial economies. The table also reports the volatility of government
expenditure relative to output. Across the three groups government expenditure is
more volatile than output. While in terms of output volatility poor and emerging are
indistinguishable from one another and more volatile than industrial economies, in
terms of government expenditure volatility, the emerging group looks similar to the
developed groups in terms of both magnitude of the statistic and the t test. Govern-
ment expenditure is significantly more volatile in emerging economies than developed
only for the series in di↵erence and population weighted mean. To summarize, gov-
ernment expenditure for emerging economies is similar to the poor group in terms of
cyclicality and similar to the developed group in terms of volatility.
18The contemporaneous correlation increases from expenditure to net expenditure for emerging
and rich but nor for poor.
14
Another relevant statistic to look at is the amplitude of government expenditure
growth defined as the di↵erence between expenditure growth during booms relative
to expenditure growth during recessions. As consistent business cycle dating is not
available across a large number of economies, I take an approach exploited in the
literature and report the average growth when real GDP growth is above median
versus below median. Figure 1.4 reports the results. The amplitude of government
expenditure for poor and emerging is in stark contrast to industrial. According to this
statistic government expenditure is acyclical for industrial and strongly pro-cyclical
for poor and emerging. The table also reports amplitude for government revenue.
The literature has suspected that the revenue process for emerging and poor govern-
ments is more volatile and governments are more constrained in raising revenue. The
amplitude statistic does show a modestly greater pro-cyclicality of revenue for poor
and emerging but the di↵erence is not as stark as in the expenditure case.
Finally figure 1.5 reports the OLS estimates of the elasticity of government revenue
and expenditure to real GDP. The revenue elasticity of 1 for industrial is consistent
with the literature. Government revenue is more responsive to fluctuation in real
output in the case of emerging and poor economies. The pooled OLS estimate for the
elasticity of expenditure to GDP uncovers again evidence of greater pro-cyclicality of
government expenditure.
Next I report diagnostics for government consumption expenditure, which is a com-
ponent of total government expenditure. While the literature on fiscal pro-cyclicality
emphasizes the behavior of government expenditure over the cycle, the multiplier for
non-industrial countries has been studied in the context government consumption
15
expenditure. 19 The necessity for data spanning many economies at the quarterly
frequency has been partially responsible for this. I calculate descriptive statistics for
government consumption expenditure to see if its cyclical behavior is similar to that
of government expenditure. Figure 1.6 reports the contemporaneous correlation and
figure 1.7 summarizes the volatility of government consumption relative to output. It
turns out that government consumption both in levels and first di↵erence is highly
pro-cyclical across the three groups. The magnitude of the statistic is similar across
the three groups and the t tests suggest that we cannot reject the hypothesis that
the correlation is the same across the three groups. As a share of real GDP govern-
ment consumption is acyclical or counter-cyclical across the three groups. In levels
there is no distinction between the counter-cyclicality of government consumption in
developed and emerging. In di↵erence, however, the share is more counter-cyclical
in developed and the di↵erence is statistically significant. In terms of volatility the
poor group stands out from the rest as being substantially more volatile. Emerging
economies have similar volatility as rich except for the population-weighted mean in
di↵erence. Government consumption is directly part of aggregate demand. We can
decompose the cyclicality of the government consumption as follows:









is indistinguishable between emerging and rich while the corr(Y,G)
confounds the e cacy of government consumption expenditure with the government
response to cyclical fluctuations. As the SVAR analysis discussed in the subsequent
sections shows the government response in emerging economies is more pro-cyclical
due to credit constraints while the e cacy of government consumption is substan-
19Ilzetzki et al. (2013) influential paper uses government consumption expenditure to estimate the
government spending multiplier.
16
tially lower for emerging economies.
In the previous sections I review evidence of whether fiscal pro-cyclicality is still
present in the data. The behavior of pro-cyclicality over time warrants attention
because Frankel et al. (2012) o↵ers evidence that fiscal pro-cyclicality (measured as
the correlation between annual government expenditure and the cyclical component
of GDP) has decreased over time for some developing and emerging economies. They
relate this change to institutional improvement in this group of countries. Figure 1.8
plots the rolling window correlation between the cyclical component of GDP and gov-
ernment expenditure for the three groups of countries. I report the correlation for 5,
10 and 15 years horizons. While there is an improvement across the all groups over
the 90s and early 2000s, the correlation is U-shaped. In other words there is a reversal
to pro-cyclicality towards the end of the sample. Figure 1.9 repeats the same exer-
cise for net government expenditure (excluding interest expense). The same pattern
emerges. This ensures that the question of fiscal pro-cyclicality is still empirically
relevant.
Although the analysis does not include direct measures of capital flows, I look at the
cyclical behavior of the GBI and the EMBI Plus indices next. Figure 1.11 shows the
empirical distribution of sovereign rate on international financial markets adjusted
for inflation. The left pane excludes only realization during default while the right
pane excludes defaulters in the sample altogether (Argentina, Ecuador, Greece and
Russia). On average emerging governments pay up to 4% higher rates on international
borrowing. The standard deviation of the pooled realized rates appears similar, but
this clearly driven by the exorbitant yields faced by Greece during the European
bond crisis. Excluding Greece as well as the other defaulters highlights the fact that
the distribution for emerging yields is also more spread out. Figure 1.12 reports the
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median rate for each country in the sample. The fact that emerging governments pay
a higher rate on external obligations emerges again. Within the developed group,
the GIIPS pay higher rates than the rest of the developed economies. South Africa’s
median rate on the other hand is comparable to developed economies’ rates. Towards
the top of the two groups, we find governments that experienced default during the
sample years: Greece for developed and Argentina and Ecuador for emerging. I report
median rates to attenuate the e↵ect of default episodes. Nonetheless the relative
country order is barely changed in terms of the average rate and maximum realized
rate for each country (Figure 1.13). Finally, Figure 1.14 reports the sovereign rates
of the distressed European economies relative to several GBI averages during the
European debt crisis. Clearly Greece experienced an exorbitant hike reflected in the
Greek GBI index. Greece’s interest spike is followed by Portugal and Ireland’s and to
a lesser extent by Spain and Italy. The GBI average excluding the distress economies
are actually decreasing. As a robustness check (reported in a subsequent section), I
discuss excluding the GIIPS from the analysis.
1.5 Identification
The widely accepted identification outlined by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) uses
institutional knowledge. The paper as well as much of the subsequent literature con-
strain the government to respond to macroeconomic fundamentals with at least a
quarter delay. In other words within a period, the government cannot respond to
macroeconomic fundamentals. The assumption is justified by pointing out institu-
tional delays in implementing fiscal changes. The delays are related to both collecting
data on the private sector as well as legislating and executing fiscal reforms. For this
reason the use of quarterly data is essential. This identification can be recast as an A
model outlined in detail in Lutkepohl (2007). In particular I assume that the observed
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relationships in the data can be modeled as a stationary VAR of order p:
yt = A1yt 1 + ....+ Apyt p + ut
yt is a vector 
gt gdpt it tbyt rust Rt
 
gt is government consumption, gdpt is output, it is in investment, tbyt is trade balance
relative to GDP, rust is the world safe rate proxy and Rt is the sovereign interest rate.
All variables are expressed in real terms.
Further I assume that there is an A matrix such that:
Ayt = A
⇤
1yt 1 + ...+ A
⇤
pyt p + et
where et is a vector of orthogonal structural shocks with a diagonal ⌃e covariance
matrix. The assumption implies the A-model formulation:
Aut = et
with AAi = A⇤i . After imposing appropriate restrictions on A we can bring the
following system to the data:




1yt 1 + ...+ A
⇤
pyt p + et













with ⇥i =  iA 1
The restriction I impose on A are based on Blanchard and Perotti (2002) for the
public sector part of the model and on Uribe and Yue (2006) for the macroeconomic
fundamentals. Uribe and Yue (2006) propose the identification I employ and verify
that it is consistent with the canonical IRBC model of a small open economy. In par-
ticular their identification assumes that the interest rates respond to fundamentals
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u = et
I assume that a country cannot single-handedly influence the world safe rate. Hence
the impact and lagged feedback coe cients are set to 0. The literature is in general
comfortable making this assumption about emerging markets. As I am interested in
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studying both emerging and developed economies in parallel to establish di↵erences
in their behavior, I have to consider to what extent this is a justifiable assumption.
Ultimately we are looking for a measure of global factors i.e. a variable which has
the same realization in all countries per time period.20 Figure 1.16 displays Graner-
causality test. The figure shows the coe cient for each country in the system. For the
vast majority of countries we cannot reject the null that the country fundamentals
do not a↵ect the safe rate. The ”exceptions” are not the countries we would have
expected so I attribute the rejection of the null to the short time series.
The panel structure of the data allows us to get around the sparsity of individual
country data. Data on fiscal variables as well as aggregate demand variables start
mostly in the early 1990s. Apart from this consideration, the coverage of the EMBI
and the GBI indices also imposes a similar constraint on the individual time series
data. The dataset includes 84 quarters per country with some missing data for in-
dividual countries. This is by no means su ciently long time-series to assure us in
the validity of the estimates. This problem is alleviated by the panel dimension. At
the same time, the panel structure of the data posits the challenge of dealing with
cross-country heterogeneity. I follow the panel VAR literature in assuming that the
dynamic response for a country are the same up to randomly distributed country
specific fixed e↵ect:
uit = µi + ⌫it
It is further assumed that the two disturbance components are mean 0 and orthogonal
to each other.
E(µi) = E(⌫it) = E(µi⌫it) = 0
20In the dynamic panel (GMM) exercise the data has been deseasonalized only as the main equa-
tion is specified in first di↵erences, while for the FE e↵ect estimation, I use linearly detrended and
deseasonalized data. Estimates are extremely close if I quadratically detrend or if I use detrended
data for the GMM exercise.
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with i 2 1 : N and t 2 1 : T . The presence of a fixed country e↵ect would bias pooled
estimates of the system’s coe cients.21 Lagged dependent variables in the system
raise concern about the fixed e↵ect estimator su↵ering from Nickell bias (Nickell
(1981)) i.e. the demeaned lagged regressors being correlated with the demeaned dis-
turbances. For this purpose I employ dynamic panel estimation. In particular I use
the di↵erence GMM estimator: the equations are estimated in first di↵erence with lags
of the regressors used as instruments. First di↵erencing the equations expunges the
fixed e↵ect. However, it introduces the problem that the first di↵erenced disturbances
(4uit = uit   uit 1) are endogenous to the lagged regressors (4yit 1 = yit 1   yit 2).
To address this issue the di↵erence GMM uses past realizations of the lagged depen-
dent variables to instrument for the endogenous first-di↵erenced regressors with yt T ,
T 2 2...t 1 being all valid instruments in the absence of first order autocorrelation in
⌫it. 22 I choose to use three lags of instruments and verify that the results are robust
to using fewer or more instruments. To verify the validity of the instruments used
in the GMM estimation, I report the Sargan / Hansen test for joint validity as well
as the Arellano and Bond test for autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic disturbance
⌫it. Since 4uit is correlated with 4uit 1 by construction, testing for second order
autocorrelation in the di↵erenced errors is a valid test for first order autocorrelation
in the residuals in levels.23 Both the Sargan / Hansen test and the Arellano and
Bond test confirm that the matrices yt p i for i 2 [1 : 3] are valid instruments. Only
for the investment equations is the null of no first order autocorrelation rejected. To
alleviate this concern, I also report estimates of the third row of the Ai matrices
using alternative dynamic panel estimators.24,25 While the dynamic panel estimators
21The bias would be less important, the longer is the time series.
22Autocorrelation in the error would force us to truncate the sequence of appropriate instruments.
23Autocorrelation test p+1 on the di↵erenced residuals tests for p correlation in the residuals in
levels.
24The Arellano Bond test statistic in constructed under the assumption of large N and small T
as well as E(eitejt) = 0. Controlling for the safe rate helps with the latter assumption, but the
relatively small N in the empirical sample (N = 30) might be problematic.
25For a comprehensive discussion of dynamic panel estimators and literature review see Roodman
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are less taxing in terms of degrees of freedom loss due to deeper-lag instruments, the
time series length (T = 82) in the data is perhaps su cient to make the dynamic
bias small and to justify the use of a more straightforward estimation technique such
as the fixed e↵ect estimator. In turns out that in this particular empirical specifi-
cation the fixed e↵ect estimates of the system lead to instability issues. Empirically
I demonstrate that the distressed European economies as a group are the potential
culprit. Excluding them indeed fixes the problem. I report fixed e↵ect estimation for
the sample excluding this group (GIIPS: Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain) as a
robustness check.
Finally in order to estimate di↵erences in dynamic responses between developed and
emerging economies I modify the estimation to include an emerging-dummy interac-
tion26:
al,ij = a˜l,0(ij) + a˜l,1(ij)⇥ [EME]
al,ij is the ij-th element of Al for l 2 [0..p] and EME selects the emerging economies
in the sample.
The AIC criterion selects one lag as optimal (see Figure 1.37). The autoregressive
coe cients for the safe rate are estimated by OLS in first di↵erences.
1.6 SVAR Analysis
Figure 1.31 and figure 1.32 show the GMM estimates of the system for both the de-
veloped and the emerging group. Figure 1.33 explicitly focuses on the government
(2009).
26This is equivalent to estimating the system separately for each group, but leads to a slight
e ciency improvement.
23
response. Overall, the government responds pro-cyclically to output for both groups.
The point estimates suggest that worsening international financial conditions decrease
government consumption. Increases in the safe rate as well as the sovereign interna-
tional borrowing rate lead to a decrease in government consumption for both groups.
Both the group by group estimates and the joint estimates suggest that emerging
economies are more mindful of international credit constraints and decrease govern-
ment consumption in response to an increase in the safe borrowing rate and their own
sovereign borrowing rate. Conversely, international credit constraints have a lower
bite for governments in developed economies vis-a`-vis those in emerging economies.
Moreover, the government response to output is similar for the two groups and statis-
tically indistinguishable. This juxtaposition sheds light on one of the main questions
of the paper: whether emerging governments are more sensitive to the cycle and
whether they respond more pro-cyclically to output fluctuations. Conditional on my
identification, it turns out this is not the case.
Figure 1.34 reports results for the government response function estimated using
private GDP instead. I confirm that emerging governments decrease consumption
expenditure in response to increases in the borrowing rate they face on international
markets. This is still the main di↵erence between the two government response func-
tions. If anything, the coe cient on the interest rate is even higher in magnitude
when private GDP is used in the estimation. This is also the case with FE estimates
(figure 1.35). The FE estimation confirms that the main di↵erence between emerging
and developed economies stems from their response to the sovereign rate. Di↵erently
from GMM, the fixed e↵ect estimation suggests that government consumption does
not respond to GDP fluctuations at all. The coe cient on real GDP is lower and
imprecisely estimated. In the next section I show that the bootstrapped impulse re-
sponse still implies an increase in government consumption following a positive output
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shock even in the FE estimation case. Finally, figure 1.36 shows another robustness
check for the government response function. In particular, I report fixed e↵ect esti-
mates for a country subset which excludes Greece, Portugal and Italy. Greece and
Portugal are the countries experiencing the largest increase in government yields rel-
ative to the rest of several subsets of the GBI index family during the European
debt crisis. I choose to report this particular cut of the data because excluding all
of the distressed European economies leads to stability issues in the VAR analysis.
I revisit this issues in the robustness section. I exclude Greece, Portugal and Italy
and re-estimate the system with FE. I also report results from GMM estimation
which excludes all distressed European economies (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy
and Spain). This particular GMM estimation should be interpreted with care, be-
cause further decreasing the number of panels raises concerns. In the GMM case, the
di↵erence between the full sample and the sub-sample for the developed group is that
the coe cient on the lagged dependent variable increases and there is no response of
government consumption to fundamentals apart from that to the safe rate. For the
emerging group the GMM estimates on the subset suggest just the opposite: govern-
ment consumption is less persistent and more responsive to fundamentals relative to
emerging. The fixed e↵ect estimates on the full sample and subsample are quite sim-
ilar. In both FE exercises governments do not respond to fundamentals apart from
the sovereign rate. Increases in the international sovereign rate are contractionary for
both the full sample and the subset albeit imprecisely estimated in the subsample case.
Returning to the rest of the variables in the model (figure 1.31 & figure 1.32), we
already see that the e cacy of government consumption as a policy instrument is
substantially lower as captured by the impact coe cient on GDP. As anticipated
an increase in government consumption is expansionary. However, as the coe cient
on the interaction (GC ⇥ I(Emerging)) suggests, the impact coe cient for emerging
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economies is a third that for developed. The crowding-out of investment on the other
hand by government consumption is lower in emerging economies. The coe cient on
L.GC is practically o↵-set by the coe cient on L.GC⇥I(Emerging) for investment. Al-
though the current analysis does not include measures of how the government finances
government expenditure, the lack of crowding out for investment is symptomatic of
revenue financed increases in government expenditure for emerging economies, which
can be one factor behind the lower multiplier for this group (I discuss the multiplier
in the next section). The estimates suggest that government consumption leads to a
greater deterioration in the trade balance for developed economies which is consistent
with either a greater share of imported goods and services in the government con-
sumption basket or a stronger multiplier on private sector consumption. Finally, for
either group fluctuations in government consumption do not impact directly sovereign
borrowing constraints.
As anticipated, investment is strongly pro-cyclical for both emerging and developed.
The trade balance is again as anticipated counter-cyclical due to the e↵ect of invest-
ment as emphasized by the IRBC. Sovereign credit constraints do not directly a↵ect
fundamentals except in the case of investment for developed economies. On the other
hand the sovereign rate shows a lot of persistence for developed economies and less
so for emerging. As a matter of fact I estimate a significant feedback from output to
the sovereign borrowing rate for emerging and not for developed. The sovereign rate
is less persistent in the case of emerging economies. To capture the rich dynamics of
the system I discuss the impulse response analysis in the next section.
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1.6.1 Impulse Responses
Shocks to Government Consumption
Figure 1.17 reports the impulse response to a unitary orthogonal shock to government
consumption expenditure. Government consumption expenditure is expansionary for
both emerging and rich economies. For the rich group there is a greater evidence of
investment crowding out during the initial quarters for which the impulse response is
statistically indistinguishable from 0. For subsequent quarters developed economies
investment is higher but the impulse responses for the two groups are still statisti-
cally indistinguishable from each other. The e↵ectiveness of government consumption
in stimulating output is ostensibly higher for the developed group. Government con-
sumption shocks cause a slight deterioration in the trade balance. Finally the response
of the interest rate is the mirror image for the two groups with borrowing conditions
improving for emerging economies in response to a government consumption shock.
As we saw in the estimates of the system the response of the borrowing rate is de-
termined by the response of the rate to output fluctuations rather than the directly
through government consumption. Finally there is no response of the world safe rate
by construction. As the persistence of government consumption di↵ers between the
2 groups I calculate the multiplier next.
Figure 1.18 reports the government consumption multiplier. Following the literature,
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Normally the literature reports the multiplier e↵ect of government (consumption)
expenditure on GDP. To facilitate the comparison between the two groups, I report
the multiplier e↵ect of shocks on all variables in the system. There is a striking dif-
ference between the multiplier e↵ect of government consumption on output in the
two groups. In emerging economies government consumption is substantially less ef-
fective in stimulating output; the impact multiplier is roughly two times lower than
the impact multiplier for developed economies. For both groups the multiplier is less
than 1, which is consistent with estimates of the multiplier in Ilzetzki et al. (2013).
However, di↵erently from them I do not obtain negative multipliers. I do not find
di↵erence in the two groups for the investment multiplier which is consistent with
bigger crowding out for the developed group. The deterioration in the trade bal-
ance is of similar magnitude for both groups. Finally, as fundamentals improve, the
sovereign borrowing rate also improves for emerging economies. On impact, a unitary
increase in government consumption leads to a 16 basis points decrease in the rate.
The cumulative multiplier e↵ect is as high as 12%. In other words, a 10% increase in
government consumption decreases the sovereign borrowing rate by 1.23% for emerg-
ing economies and while the same increase in government consumption would induce
an increases in the rate by 73 basis points for developed over the whole cycle. Fig-
ure 1.18 also reports the government consumption multiplier on private GDP. The
comparison between the two groups still holds with the short-run multipliers being
up to 3 times lower and the long run multiplier up to 2 times lower for emerging
economies. It should be noted that estimates deal with o cially reported GDP. If we
had a measure of the informal sector or the shadow economy, estimates of the fiscal
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multiplier for the informal sector would be also very informative.
Shocks to Output
Next I consider shocks to output. Figure 1.19 reports the response of the variables
in the model to a unitary shock to output. The empirical responses are consistent
with the predictions of the SOE IRBC model: investment responds more than one
for one with output and the trade balance is countercyclical. The impact response
of investment in emerging economies is slightly higher. However the investment re-
sponse converges to being indistinguishable between emerging and rich as the horizon
increases. One of the key questions I am after is whether emerging governments
respond di↵erently to output fluctuations; in particular whether government con-
sumption expenditure re-enforces the cycle. While the median response for emerging
governments is higher, the response of government consumption to output fluctuation
is indistinguishable from the developed group’s. This results suggests that emerging
governments do not necessarily have a more pro-cyclical stance. Instead as revealed
by the response to interest rate shocks which is to be discussed next, government
consumption expenditure is more sensitive to sovereign interest rate shocks. The
sovereign rate responds to fundamentals in emerging economies while the response in
developed is statistically indistinguishable from 0. Figure 1.20 reports the multiplier
e↵ect of an output shock on the rest of the model variables. The median multiplier
e↵ect of output on government consumption is higher- between 4 to 24 percentage
points, in emerging economies. Given that the coe cients on the response function
are the same, the higher multiplier is due to the fact that the increase in output
relaxes the borrowing constants for emerging governments. In other words, emerging
governments raise government consumption in response to a positive output shock
because of the relaxed international borrowing constraints. In particular in emerg-
ing economies the median impact improvement in the government interest rate is 14
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percentage points and the long run improvement- 33 percentage points. For the de-
veloped group the improvement in the long run is roughly 1 percentage point and is
not statistically significant.
Shocks to the Sovereign Borrowing Rate
Figure 1.21 reports the impulse response of the model variables to a unitary shock in
the sovereign borrowing rate. The shock leads to a contraction in emerging economies
albeit a milder one relative to the estimates in Uribe and Yue (2006) and Akinci
(2013). The developed group can weather the shock without a significant decrease in
the government consumption or output. However, for the developed group, there is
a substantial decrease in investment and an improvement in the trade balance. To
account for the di↵erence in persistence of the shock propagation I recast the impulse
response in a multiplier form as shown in figure 1.22. The median multiplier for
emerging governments’ consumption to an interest rate shock is twice as high as that
for developed. The median response for output is twice as high. However, as noted
before investment in developed economies responds twice as strongly to an interest
rate shock as investment in the emerging group.
Shocks to the Safe Rate
Figure 1.23 displays the impulse responses to a unitary shocks to the safe rate. As
the autoregressive process for the safe rate (0.992 in level and 0.596 in di↵erence) is
close to non-stationary I report estimates with the rate in di↵erences. The safe rate
shocks matter mostly for the international borrowing rate faced by sovereigns with
a limited implication for other fundamentals. This is consistent with the findings of
Akinci (2013) who also finds that the global safe rate is the least important among the
international financial conditions she considers. It should be noted that an increase
in the safe rate decreases the sovereign rate for emerging and increases the sovereign
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rate for developed. My results concur with the analysis of Eichengreen and Mody
(1998), which focuses on first issuance emerging markets spreads in the early 90s.
The sign of the e↵ect depends on whether supply or demand e↵ects are stronger on
net. On the one hand a fall in the US treasury rate shifts investor demand towards
bond markets which o↵er a higher yield. The demand e↵ect will lead to a same sign
movement in the safe rate and the sovereign rate. On the other hand as shown by
Eichengreen and Mody (1998) an increase in the US rate decreases the likelihood of
a bond issuance in emerging markets which in turn limits the supply and leads to a
decrease in the bond rate. Therefore, the impulse response suggest that the supply
e↵ects are leading when it comes to emerging sovereign bonds. As I do not have
direct evidence on the dependence of issuance on the US rate for developed sovereign
bonds, we I only conjecture that their issuance probability is either less sensitive to
the US rate or that demand e↵ects are stronger for this market.
1.7 Variance of Estimated Shocks
The A-model of identification I employ allows me to use the relationship: Aut = et
to find an estimate of the diagonal elements of eˆt = Aˆuˆt. This allows me to back
out estimates of the volatility of orthogonal shocks: ⌦ˆe = Aˆ⌦ˆuAˆ0. The analysis sug-
gests that emerging economies are indeed subject to a more volatile shock process in
terms of output, government consumption and sovereign yield. Figure 1.24 reports
the country and group breakdown of the estimated government consumption shock
volatility. In terms of policy shocks (to government consumption) I find evidence of
substantially higher degree of discretion in the conduct of fiscal policy in emerging
economies relative to developed. In particular the volatility of the fiscal shock is
roughly 3 times higher for emerging government relative to developed. This result
is important because the literature has highlighted the negative consequences of fis-
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cal policy discretion / volatility on long-run growth (e.g. Fatas and Mihov (2003)).
The country breakdown shows Portugal, Greece and Finland as the countries with
the highest volatility in the developed group and Ukraine (with shock volatility more
than twice the group average) for the emerging group. Excluding the countries with
the highest volatility for the two groups still preserves the comparison. Another dis-
tinction is that while fiscal policy shocks have similar magnitude to output shocks in
developed economies, their volatility is roughly twice that of output shocks in emerg-
ing economies.
The volatility of output shocks is summarized in figure 1.25. Output shock volatil-
ity in emerging economies is twice that of developed economies. The comparison is
preserved even when excluding countries which look like outliers in their respective
group. There is re-ordering of countries in the empirical distribution of estimated
shock volatility among the three shocks considered. However, Greece and Finland
are again at the top of the distribution for the two groups. In fact I find these two
countries have the highest shock volatility in the developed group across all three
shocks.
Emerging economies are also battered by substantially bigger sovereign rate shocks
(figure 1.26). I find that the volatility of interest rate shocks is about four times
larger for emerging economies. That being said, it should be noted that rate shocks
exhibit lower volatility across both groups relative to policy and output shocks. In
particular, I find that sovereign rate shocks are half as volatile as output shocks for
both groups.
Noting that reduced form shock estimates are obtained in first di↵erences (this is
specific to the GMM estimation), I reconstruct the residuals in levels. While the
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reduced form residuals in di↵erences are by construction mean zero, the level estimates
are not. I use this feature of the GMM dynamic panel approach to obtain estimates
of the coe cient variation of ⌦ˆe. This statistic can be interpreted as a measure of
uncertainty. In terms of policy volatility, the developed group outstrips the emerging
group (figure 1.27). This is largely due to Greece, Finland and Portugal, which
also have the highest policy volatility. Excluding these three countries reverses the
comparison, with the emerging group having a high degree of policy uncertainty;
the coe cient of variation for the emerging group is 2.4 versus 1.4 for the developed.
Perhaps not surprisingly, Ukraine is at the top of the emerging group in terms of policy
uncertainty. The uncertainty characterizing output shocks is comparable across both
groups once I exclude Greece, Portugal and Finland (figure 1.28). This is not true
for sovereign shocks. Emerging governments face twice the uncertainty in shocks to
internationally traded debt prices (figure 1.29). This gives a sense of the extent to
which emerging governments have to provide insurance to the private sector while
they themselves are battered by shocks which are marked with both higher volatility
and uncertainty.
1.8 Variance Decomposition
In this section I perform variance decomposition to establish the relative importance
of each shock of interest for business cycle fluctuations. Figure 1.37, figure 1.38,
figure 1.39 show the variance decomposition for an orthogonalized government con-
sumption shock, output shock and for the international sovereign rate shock respec-
tively. As is standard in the literature, I use a horizon of 20 quarters (5 years) for
the purpose of variance decomposition at business cycle frequency. Each figure shows
the share of the specified variable (government consumption, output and the rate) in
the h-step forward error variance decomposition for each variable in the system. The
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h-step ahead forecast is given by:
yt   yt+h|t = ut+h +  1ut+h 1 + ...+  h 1ut+1
We can represent the forecast as a MA in terms of the structural errors:












We can express FEV Dk,j: the share of variable j in the forecast error variance of








The reported results for the government consumption shock suggest that innovations
to government consumption are responsible for 16% of output fluctuations in emerg-
ing economies and up to 34% in developed. This result is rationalized by recalling
that despite the high volatility of government shocks, the e cacy of those shocks is
roughly 50% lower in emerging economies. The importance of government consump-
tion shocks for investment is similar to their contribution to output for the emerging
group, while for the developed group government consumption shocks contribute sub-
stantially more to output fluctuations than to investment fluctuations.
The contribution of sovereign rate fluctuations is arguably small for both country
groups- 2% of output in emerging and less than 1% in developed. My estimates are
in the lower end of the literature for emerging economies; Akinci (2013) for example
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estimates the contribution of international rate fluctuations to the variance decompo-
sition of output in emerging economies to be roughly 20%. My estimates are based on
similar data. However, I explicitly account for the role of government consumption,
jointly estimate the model on both emerging and developed countries, increase the
time dimension by three years to include the taper tantrum and double the number
of panels. In contrast to the aforementioned paper I consider both dynamic panel
estimates as well as fixed e↵ect estimation. It should be acknowledged that much in
the spirit of the rest of the literature, I find that sovereign rate shocks play a more
important role for the emerging group: they account for twice the share of forecast
error variance in emerging than in developed economies. Another di↵erence between
the two groups is that in emerging economies interest rates account for a smaller share
of their own fluctuations. Thus the feedback between fluctuations in fundamentals
and international borrowing rates is stronger in emerging countries.
Of central interest to this paper is whether output fluctuations play a bigger role
for government consumption in the emerging group. It should be noted that both
output and government consumption shocks are more volatile in the emerging group
as highlighted in the previous section. It turns out that governments (in the sense
of government consumption) are responsible for a similar share of real GDP fluc-
tuations across the two groups with developed countries actually surpassing their
emerging counterparts. The observation that government consumption is responsible
for a smaller share of output fluctuations in emerging economies while at the same
time output being responsible for a similar share of government consumption fluctu-
ations leads me to conclude that there is no dramatic di↵erence in fiscal stabilization
between the two groups as far as government consumption is concerned. There is
also a stark comparison between the role of output for interest rate fluctuation in
emerging economies. Output fluctuations are responsible for more than 20% of the
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fluctuations in the price of international debt in emerging economies with this share
being substantially smaller in the developed group. Similarities emerge when looking
at the share of investment and trade balance fluctuations. Output fluctuations are
responsible for a similar share of investment and trade balance variance. For both
groups output accounts for almost half of the fluctuations in investment.
1.9 Robustness
In this section I explore to what extent results are sensitive to the choice of countries
and to including the European debt crisis in the sample. One concern would be re-
lated to the distressed European economies and whether the identification imposing
the same dynamic matrices across both the core and the GIIPS is not too restrictive.
Because decreasing the number of panels might be problematic in the GMM cases, I
choose to explore di↵erent country subsets in the context of FE estimation. Before
proceeding further I discuss some stability issues which emerge in the case of Fixed
E↵ect. Figure 1.43 shows the eigenvalues for selected dynamic matrices. The full
sample GMM is stable, but FE estimation for both the full sample and the sample
excluding the GIIPS is not. In both cases one of the eigenvalues is not strictly inside
the unit circle. The issue pertains specifically to the developed group; the eigenvalues
for the emerging group are strictly inside the unit circle for all cases. The issues for
the developed group are due to the coe cient on the sovereign rate. The fixed e↵ect
estimation implies an autoregressive coe cient for the developed sovereign rate of
1.025 (standard error = 0.019) and 0.844 (standard error = 0.023) for emerging. The
autoregressive coe cient increases if the sovereign yield is specified in first di↵erence;
in particular for developed economies the coe cient increases to 1.763 (standard error
= 0.173) while for the emerging group the coe cient drops to 0.421 (standard error
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= 0.18). To shed more light on the issue I estimate the bottom row of the dynamic
matrices country by country. Figure 1.44 displays the autoregressive coe cient for
each country. Excluding Greece, Italy and Portugal induces stationarity as shown by
the eigenvalues.27
After excluding Greece, Portugal and Italy I redo the impulse response analysis. Fig-
ure 1.40 reports the result for a government consumption shock. Generally the two
estimators agree on the role and propagation of government consumption shocks.
Overall the fixed e↵ect estimation implies a lower multiplier e↵ect of a government
consumption shock on output. However, the comparison in terms of how e↵ective pol-
icy shocks in emerging economies relative to developed are, still holds. Government
consumption is substantially more e↵ective in developed economies. The sign of the
median investment, trade balance and sovereign rate impulse responses is unchanged
relative to the GMM estimation. However, the investment response is estimated
with much wider confidence bands for developed and is indistinguishable from 0 for
emerging. The GMM estimation attributes a bigger movement to investment, while
the fixed e↵ect estimation- to the trade balance. The fixed e↵ect estimation still
implies an increase in international borrowing rates in response to a policy shock for
the developed group and just the opposite for the emerging group.
Figure 1.41 reports the impulse response of the system to output shocks for the FE
e↵ect estimation case. This robustness check confirms that government consumption
does not respond more procyclically in the emerging group. It also confirms that
output expansion decreases the international borrowing rate for the emerging group.
The biggest di↵erence between the two estimators stems from the behavior of the
sovereign yield for developed. In contrast with the GMM estimates, the FE impulse
27Excluding Portugal is enough to induce stationarity, however results are very close to the case
of excluding all three distressed economies, which I report.
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response is much more persistent and implies an increase in the sovereign rate in
response to an expansionary output shock.
Finally figure 1.42 provides estimates of the impulse response to a sovereign yield
shock. The result confirms that sovereign yield shocks are contractionary for emerging
economies. The impulse response for the developed group leads us to believe that the
shock is contractionary for government consumption and investment but expansionary
for output. Because it would be di cult for most open economy models to justify
an expansion in output, I conclude that the GMM interest rate impulse response is
more plausible.
1.10 Conclusion
International borrowing costs and business cycles are interrelated in a complex way.
The international finance literature suggests that this relationship is stronger for
emerging economies. Default risk priced into their international borrowing costs
makes these costs more tightly linked to fluctuations in macroeconomic fundamentals.
At the same time, emerging economies presumably have less perfect shock absorption
mechanisms relative to their developed counterparts. The contribution of this paper
is two-fold; first, I evaluate the hypothesis that external borrowing costs are more
important drivers of business cycles in emerging economies by studying the ques-
tion in a panel of both emerging and developed economies. Second, I investigate the
role that fiscal policy plays for the relationship between borrowing costs and busi-
ness cycle fluctuations. Led by identification demands on data availability, I focus
on government consumption as a fiscal policy tool. Developed economies provide a
benchmark against which the performance of emerging sovereigns is studied. Relative
to their developed counterparts, emerging economies’ governments are more respon-
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sive to fluctuations in their sovereign yields and contract government consumption
in response to interest rate shocks. This creates a propagation mechanism allowing
interest rate increases to lead to business cycle contractions. As measured by the con-
traction in output, interest rate shocks indeed lead to deeper contractions in emerging
economies than in rich economies.
I also find that government consumption is a substantially weaker policy tool in
emerging economies. The impact government consumption multiplier in emerging
economies is three times smaller than the impact multiplier in developed economies.
The long run multiplier in emerging economies is half the long-run multiplier in de-
veloped. The finding echoes the literature in that the level of development a↵ects the
e cacy of fiscal policy. One natural extension of the paper would be to investigate
the reasons behind why government consumption is less e↵ective in the emerging
group. A few reasonable suspects are: 1) due to the larger share of the informal /
shadow economy a larger part of the multiplier is ”invisible” to the econometrician
2) structural di↵erences: the higher level of product and labor market regulations in
these economies28 3) soundness of institutions: for instance, if government contracts
and orders are allocated in a noncompetitive way by corrupt bureaucrats and civil
servants, government spending would be more wasteful or go towards groups with a
lower propensity to consume.
1.11 Tables and Figures
28I suspect that di↵erences in product and labor market regulations might be able to partly explain
the substantial di↵erence in the multiplier between developed and emerging economies. Loayza et al.
(2004) show evidence that developing countries are more regulated and find that a higher degree of
labor and product market regulations leads to a slower GDP growth and a higher GDP volatility.
Using US data and a model based identification, Dawson and Seater (2013) find that government











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.3: Government expenditure cyclicality and country size. The data in levels
is linearly detrended and deseasoned in logs; the number of countries is 168; the
time period is 1980 to 2014; the frequency is yearly; the data source is WEO IMF;
variables are expressed in real terms; the country groups are determined according to
PPP adjusted annual GDP: a country is classified as poor if its 2011 PPP adjusted
GDP falls below 6000, as emerging if its average 2011 PPP adjusted GDP per capita
is between 6000 and 30000, and as rich if its PPP adjusted GDP surpasses 30000.
The table shows the correlation between country size (population) and the cyclicality
of government expenditure.
Poor EM Rich
ρ(ρ1,population) 50.2922*** 50.2222*** 0.0827***
ρ(ρ2,population) 50.3138*** 50.0473** 0.0522*
Figure 1.4: Government expenditure cyclicality in terms of amplitude. The data is
deseasoned in logs and expressed in first di↵erence; the number of countries is 168;
the time period is 1980 to 2014; the frequency is yearly; the data source is WEO IMF;
variables are expressed in real terms; the country groups are determined according to
PPP adjusted annual GDP: a country is classified as poor if its 2011 PPP adjusted
GDP falls below 6000, as emerging if its average 2011 PPP adjusted GDP per capita
is between 6000 and 30000, and as rich if its PPP adjusted GDP surpasses 30000.














poor 7.85 1.88 5.97 8.52 1.53 6.99
emerging 6.60 2.31 4.29 7.71 1.52 6.19
industrial 2.59 3.06 :0.47 6.06 0.19 5.87
Government&Expenditure&Growth Government&Revenue&Growth
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Figure 1.5: Elasticity of government expenditure and revenue with respect to real
output. The data in levels is linearly detrended and deseasoned in logs; the number
of countries is 168; the time period is 1980 to 2014; the frequency is yearly; the data
source is WEO IMF; variables are expressed in real terms; the country groups are
determined according to PPP adjusted annual GDP: a country is classified as poor
if its 2011 PPP adjusted GDP falls below 6000, as emerging if its average 2011 PPP
adjusted GDP is between 6000 and 30000, and as rich if its PPP adjusted GDP
surpasses 30000. The table shows the pooled OLS elasticity estimates by country










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.8: Contemporaneous correlation between the cyclical component of GDP
and government expenditure by group. The data in levels is linearly detrended and
deseasoned in logs; the number of countries is 168; the time period is 1980 to 2014;
the frequency is yearly; the data source is WEO IMF; variables are expressed in real
terms; the country groups are determined according to PPP adjusted annual GDP:
a country is classified as poor if its 2011 PPP adjusted GDP falls below 6000, as
emerging if its average 2011 PPP adjusted GDP per capita is between 6000 and
30000, and as rich if its PPP adjusted GDP surpasses 30000. I report the rolling






























































Figure 1.9: Contemporaneous correlation between the cyclical component of GDP and
net government expenditure by group; government expenditure is net of interest rate
payments; The data in levels is linearly detrended and deseasoned in logs; the number
of countries is 168; the time period is 1980 to 2014; the frequency is yearly; the data
source is WEO IMF; variables are expressed in real terms; the country groups are
determined according to PPP adjusted annual GDP: a country is classified as poor
if its 2011 PPP adjusted GDP per capita falls below 6000, as emerging if its average
2011 PPP adjusted GDP is between 6000 and 30000, and as rich if its PPP adjusted
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Figure 1.10: Government size across groups; the time period is 1960 to 2014; the
frequency is yearly; the data source is WEO IMF; the country groups are determined
according to PPP adjusted annual GDP: a country is classified as poor if its 2011
PPP adjusted GDP per capita falls below 6000, as emerging if its average 2011
PPP adjusted GDP is between 6000 and 30000, and as rich if its PPP adjusted
GDP surpasses 30000. The average statistic for a group is calculated as either a
simple or as a population weighted group average of the country level statistics; All
statistics are calculated and reported as a share of a country’s GDP. The definitions of
Government Expenditure, Government Consumption (GC) are as emphasized earlier
in the paper. Revenue (General Government) is defined as taxes, social contributions
and grants receivable; Primary Balance (PB) is net lending/ net borrowing (revenue
minus net expenditure) i.e. a measure of whether the general government is putting
into or taking away financial resources from the pubic sector. Gross Debt (GD) is
defined as all current general government’s liabilities (SDRs, currency and deposits,
debt securities, loans, insurance, pension and standardized guarantee schemes.) Debt
excludes financial derivatives, equity and investment fund shares. Debt can be valued
at market, nominal or face value. Net Debt (ND) nets out debt assets held by the
government from the general government gross debt.
poor	 eme-s rich
27.6 32.7 42.2
pop	weight 26.5 32.5 43.1
14.7 16.1 18.1
pop	weight 9.3 13.4 17.1
25.4 30.2 41.3
pop	weight 23.5 30.2 41.7
-0.1 0.2 1.1
pop	weight -0.5 0.7 0.8
73.4 55.9 60.0
pop	weight 69.3 57.2 65.6
60.5 46.6 26.0








Figure 1.11: Distribution of the yield-to-maturity for the EMBI+ and the GBI index;
statistics pooled across countries; quarterly data (1994q1-2014q4); the yield is deflated
by my constructed measure of US expected inflation; the right panel excludes the four

























Figure 1.12: Median yield for the countries in the sample (EMBI+ for emerging
economies and GBI for developed); quarterly data (1994q1-2014q4); the yield is de-






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.14: Yields for the distressed European economies during the European debt
crises relative to the GBI Average (all GBI countries except distressed), the GBI
Average: Europe (all European GBI economies except distressed) and GBI Average:



























GBI Average: Europe GBI Average: Eurozone
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Figure 1.15: Unconditional correlation between yield and real output
! p-values ! p-values
Argentina -0.0882 0.4780 Australia 0.7181 0.0000
Brazil -0.2012 0.0735 Austria 0.4806 0.0001
Bulgaria -0.1641 0.1654 Belgium 0.5082 0.0000
Colombia 0.179 0.1638 Canada 0.7106 0.0000
Ecuador -0.5379 0.0000 Denmark 0.5224 0.0000
Mexico -0.263 0.0156 Finland 0.7205 0.0000
Peru -0.3915 0.0007 France 0.8032 0.0000
Philippines -0.7212 0.0000 Germany 0.5179 0.0000
Russia -0.4219 0.0007 Greece -0.8117 0.0000
South	Africa 0.4632 0.0007 HK 0.0542 0.7969
Turkey -0.5501 0.0000 Ireland -0.2241 0.0727










Figure 1.16: Country by country estimates of the e↵ect of the first lag of the desig-
nated variable on the safe rate with 2(SE) bands; table lists countries for which bands
do not include 0.
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Figure 1.17: Shock to government consumption; impulse response of model variables
to an orthogonal government consumption shocks. Quarterly data (1994q1-2014q4);




























































































Figure 1.19: Shock to output; impulse response of model variables to an orthogonal
government consumption shocks. Quarterly data (1994q1-2014q4); GMM estimates;
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals based on 10000 simulations
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Figure 1.20: Multiplier e↵ect of an orthogonal output shock on the rest of the model
variables; Quarterly data (1994q1-2014q4); GMM estimates; bootstrapped 95% con-
fidence intervals based on 10000 simulations
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Figure 1.21: Shock to the country’s sovereign rate; impulse response of model variables
to an orthogonal government consumption shocks. Quarterly data (1994q1-2014q4);
GMM estimates; bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals based on 10000 simulations
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Figure 1.22: Multiplier e↵ect of an orthogonal shock to the country’s sovereign rate
on the rest of the model variables; Quarterly data (1994q1-2014q4); GMM estimates;
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals based on 10000 simulations
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Figure 1.23: Shock to the safe rate (US rate) expressed in di↵erence; impulse response
of model variables to an orthogonal safe rate shock. Quarterly data (1994q1-2014q4);
GMM estimates; bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals based on 10000 simulations
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Figure 1.24: Government shock volatility by country; author’s calculations based on
identifying orthogonal shocks from GMM estimates; Reduced form residuals in first
di↵erence; Quarterly data (1994q1-2014q4)























Estimated Volatility of Government Shocks (GMM)









Figure 1.25: Output shock volatility by country; author’s calculations based on iden-
tifying orthogonal shocks from GMM estimates; reduced form residuals in first di↵er-
ence; Quarterly data (1994q1-2014q4)
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Figure 1.26: Sovereign rate shock volatility by country; author’s calculations based
on identifying orthogonal shocks from GMM estimates; reduced form residuals in first
di↵erence; Quarterly data (1994q1-2014q4)
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Figure 1.27: Government shock volatility by country (coe cient of variation); au-
thor’s calculations based on identifying orthogonal shocks from GMM estimates; Re-
duced form residuals in levels; Quarterly data (1994q1-2014q4)
Estimated Volatility (CV) of Government Shocks (GMM)
































Figure 1.28: Output shock volatility by country (coe cient of variation); author’s
calculations based on identifying orthogonal shocks from GMM estimates; Reduced
form residuals in levels; Quarterly data (1994q1-2014q4)
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Figure 1.29: Sovereign rate shock volatility by country (coe cient of variation); au-
thor’s calculations based on identifying orthogonal shocks from GMM estimates; Re-
duced form residuals in first di↵erence; Quarterly data (1994q1-2014q4)
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Figure 1.30: AIC for GMM and fixed e↵ects; p = 1 : 5
lags developed EMEs developed EMEs
1 "46.7119 "38.1053 "49.309 "41.2971
2 "46.1426 "37.4819 "48.9648 "40.5906
3 "45.0822 "37.0076 "48.5105 "39.8988
4 "45.9714 "37.758 "48.3197 "39.8856




Table 1.1: The table shows the statement of operations according to the IMF Govern-
ment Finance Statistics Manual; The breakdown of revenue and expense by compo-
nents as accounted for by statistical agencies as well as the definition of expenditure
is of interest; source: IMF (2014)
Transactions a↵ecting Net Worth
1 Revenue
11 Taxes




21 Compensation of Employees [GFS]
22 Use of Goods and Services




27 Social Benefits [GFS]
28 Other expenses
NOB / GOB Net Operating Balance (1-2)
Transactions in Non Financial Assets






NLB Net lending (+) / Net Borrowing (-) [GFS] (1-2-31) or (1-2M)
Transactions in Financial Assets and Liabilities (Financing)
32 Net acquisition of financial assets
321 Domestic
322 External




Figure 1.31: Estimates of Ai=0,1; Dynamic panel data estimation, one-step di↵er-
ence GMM; quarterly data; deseasoned; (1994q1-2014q4); Npanels = 30; standard
errors clustered by country are reported in parenthesis; last three rows report the p-
values for the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (H0: instruments are jointly
valid i.e (1/N)Z 0Uˆ is mean 0, N is the number of panels) and the Arellano-Bond
test for autocorrelation in the error (H0: error are not l-order serially correlated i.e
(1/N)EUˆ 0 lUˆ = 0) estimates shown for the base group (developed economies)
GC Y Inv TBY Safe	R Sov.	R
GC 0.325*** 0.014 -0.150** 0.006
(0.069) (0.135) (0.053) (0.022)









L.GC 0.729*** -0.061 -0.421** 0.014 0.024*
(0.059) (0.061) (0.151) (0.045) (0.009)
L.Y 0.246** 0.683*** -0.084 0.004 -0.029
(0.072) (0.077) (0.138) (0.112) (0.015)
L.Inv -0.025 0.013 0.564*** 0.003 0.011**
(0.017) (0.022) (0.048) (0.024) (0.004)
L.TBY -0.057 -0.062 -0.069 0.153 -0.008
(0.044) (0.081) (0.097) (0.092) (0.010)
L.Safe	R -0.073*** 0.097*** 0.212** -0.014 0.596*** -0.024
(0.019) (0.017) (0.073) (0.019) (0.087) (0.014)
L.Sov.	Rate -0.052 0.013 -0.542*** 0.003 0.943***
(0.029) (0.042) (0.127) (0.042) (0.018)
N 1896 1896 1896 1896 82 1895
hansenp 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
ar1p 0.028 0.003 0.003 0.086 0.049
ar2p 0.436 0.751 0.023 0.653 0.946
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Figure 1.32: Estimates of Ai=0,1; Dynamic panel data estimation, one-step di↵erence
GMM; quarterly data; deseasonalized; (1994q1-2014q4); standard errors clustered by
country are reported in parenthesis; Npanels = 30; last three rows report the p-
values for the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (H0: instruments are jointly
valid i.e (1/N)Z 0Uˆ is mean 0, N is the number of panels) and the Arellano-Bond
test for autocorrelation in the error (H0: error are not l-order serially correlated i.e
(1/N)EUˆ 0 lUˆ = 0) estimates shown for the interacted coe cients: emerging
economies relative to developed
GC Y Inv TBY Safe	R Sov.	R
GC	x	EME -0.231** -0.052 0.116 0.003
(0.082) (0.140) (0.062) (0.026)









L.GC	x	EME 0.053 0.046 0.436* -0.041 -0.029*
(0.069) (0.063) (0.162) (0.047) (0.014)
L.Y	x	EME 0.000 0.049 -0.820** 0.076 0.050
(0.083) (0.145) (0.230) (0.142) (0.036)
L.Inv	x	EME -0.018 0.051 0.237*** 0.011 0.011
(0.033) (0.044) (0.059) (0.037) (0.026)
L.TBY	x	EME -0.002 0.048 -0.011 0.314 -0.065
(0.054) (0.122) (0.132) (0.209) (0.055)
L.Safe	Rate	x	EME -0.083 -0.130* -0.038 -0.006 0.246**
(0.048) (0.061) (0.091) (0.044) (0.072)
L.Sov.	Rate	x	EME -0.122* -0.042 0.547*** 0.064 -0.123**
(0.045) (0.093) (0.140) (0.049) (0.040)
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Figure 1.33: Dynamic panel data estimation, one-step di↵erence GMM; quarterly
data; deseasonalized; (1994q1-2014q4); Npanels = 30; standard errors clustered by
country are reported in parenthesis; last three rows report the p-values for the Hansen
test of overidentifying restrictions (H0: instruments are jointly valid i.e (1/N)Z 0Uˆ is
mean 0, N is the number of panels) and the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation in
the error (H0: error are not l-order serially correlated i.e (1/N)EUˆ 0 lUˆ = 0) Govern-
ment response function to fundamentals across the two groups (developed
and emerging); the first two columns show estimates based on group by
group estimation; last two columns show estimates for the whole sample
with developed economies being the base group.
GC GC
Rich Emerging
L.GC 0.729*** 0.782*** 0.729*** L.GC	x	EME 0.053
(0.060) (0.036) (0.059) (0.069)
L.Y 0.246** 0.247*** 0.246** L.Y	x	EME 0.000
(0.073) (0.043) (0.072) (0.083)
L.Inv -0.025 -0.043 -0.025 L.Inv	x	EME -0.018
(0.018) (0.029) (0.017) (0.033)
L.TBY -0.057 -0.059 -0.057 L.TBY	x	EME -0.002
(0.044) (0.033) (0.044) (0.054)
L.Safe	Rate -0.073** -0.156** -0.073*** L.Safe	Rate	x	EME -0.083
(0.019) (0.046) (0.019) (0.048)
L.Sov.	Rate -0.052 -0.174*** -0.052 L.Sov.	Rate	x	EME -0.122*
(0.030) (0.034) (0.029) (0.045)
N 1094 802 1896
hansenp 1 1 1
ar1p 0.001 0.04 0.028





Figure 1.34: Dynamic panel data estimation, one-step di↵erence GMM; quarterly
data; deseasoned; (1994q1-2014q4); Npanels = 30; standard errors clustered by coun-
try are reported in parenthesis; last three rows report the p-values for the Hansen test
of overidentifying restrictions (H0: instruments are jointly valid i.e (1/N)Z 0Uˆ is mean
0, N is the number of panels) and the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation in the
error (H0: errors are not l-order serially correlated i.e (1/N)EUˆ 0 lUˆ = 0) Govern-
ment response function to fundamentals across the two groups (developed
and emerging); baseline estimation compared with estimates using private
real GDP
Y	=	Yprivate Y	=	Yprivate
L.GC 0.729*** 0.773*** L.GC	x	EME 0.053 -0.048
(0.059) (0.094) (0.069) (0.116)
L.Y 0.246** 0.209 L.Y	x	EME 0.000 0.035
(0.072) (0.105) (0.083) (0.105)
L.Inv -0.025 -0.026 L.Inv	x	EME -0.018 -0.004
(0.017) (0.064) (0.033) (0.102)
L.TBY -0.057 -0.115 L.TBY	x	EME -0.002 0.165
(0.044) (0.084) (0.054) (0.150)
L.Safe	Rate -0.073*** -0.105* L.Safe	Rate	x	EME -0.083 -0.183
(0.019) (0.038) (0.048) (0.105)
L.Sov.	Rate -0.052 -0.067 L.Sov.	Rate	x	EME -0.122* -0.230*







Figure 1.35: Government response function to fundamentals across the two groups
(developed and emerging); baseline estimation compared with estimates from FE
estimation; quarterly data; data is deseasoned in the case of GMM estimation and
linearly detrended in the FE estimation. (1994q1-2014q4); Npanels = 30; standard
errors clustered by country are reported in parenthesis; last three rows report the p-
values for the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (H0: instruments are jointly
valid i.e (1/N)Z 0Uˆ is mean 0, N is the number of panels) and the Arellano-Bond
test for autocorrelation in the error (H0: error are not l-order serially correlated i.e
(1/N)EUˆ 0 lUˆ = 0)
GMM FE GMM FE
L.GC 0.729*** 0.766*** L.GC	x	EME 0.053 -0.009
(0.059) (0.061) (0.069) (0.063)
L.Y 0.246** 0.138 L.Y	x	EME 0.000 -0.099
(0.072) (0.094) (0.083) (0.114)
L.Inv -0.025 0.009 L.Inv	x	EME -0.018 0.010
(0.017) (0.039) (0.033) (0.046)
L.TBY -0.057 -0.070 L.TBY	x	EME -0.002 0.119
(0.044) (0.078) (0.054) (0.095)
L.Safe	Rate -0.073*** -0.016 L.Safe	Rate	x	EME -0.083 0.112
(0.019) (0.154) (0.048) (0.242)
L.Sov.	Rate -0.052 -0.053 L.Sov.	Rate	x	EME -0.122* -0.178**





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.37: Variance decomposition at di↵erent horizons (H = 1 : 20): government
consumption shocks; calculated based on GMM estimation on the deseasoned data;
(1994q1-2014q4); Npanels = 30;
H G Y I TB Rus R G Y I TB Rus R
1 1.000 0.004 0.010 0.006 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.018 0.013 0.017 0.000 0.000
2 0.988 0.017 0.018 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.933 0.043 0.019 0.019 0.000 0.010
3 0.967 0.037 0.036 0.007 0.000 0.003 0.876 0.086 0.019 0.020 0.000 0.024
4 0.943 0.059 0.055 0.008 0.000 0.008 0.835 0.129 0.017 0.020 0.000 0.037
5 0.919 0.079 0.074 0.008 0.000 0.014 0.805 0.168 0.019 0.020 0.000 0.049
6 0.898 0.095 0.089 0.010 0.000 0.020 0.781 0.200 0.023 0.020 0.000 0.059
7 0.880 0.108 0.103 0.011 0.000 0.027 0.763 0.226 0.029 0.020 0.000 0.068
8 0.864 0.118 0.113 0.012 0.000 0.033 0.748 0.247 0.036 0.020 0.000 0.075
9 0.851 0.127 0.122 0.013 0.000 0.038 0.736 0.264 0.043 0.020 0.000 0.080
10 0.840 0.134 0.129 0.014 0.000 0.043 0.726 0.278 0.050 0.020 0.000 0.085
….
15 0.803 0.154 0.151 0.018 0.000 0.060 0.693 0.319 0.078 0.020 0.000 0.098
16 0.799 0.156 0.153 0.018 0.000 0.062 0.689 0.324 0.082 0.020 0.000 0.100
17 0.795 0.158 0.155 0.019 0.000 0.064 0.686 0.328 0.085 0.020 0.000 0.101
18 0.791 0.160 0.157 0.019 0.000 0.066 0.682 0.331 0.089 0.020 0.000 0.102
19 0.789 0.162 0.159 0.019 0.000 0.067 0.680 0.334 0.092 0.020 0.000 0.102
20 0.786 0.163 0.160 0.020 0.000 0.069 0.677 0.337 0.094 0.020 0.000 0.103
Variance	Decomposition:	Government	Consumption	Shock
EMBI	+	 GBI
Figure 1.38: Variance decomposition at di↵erent horizons (H = 1 : 20): output
shocks; calculated based on GMM estimation on the deseasoned data; (1994q1-
2014q4); Npanels = 30;
H G Y I TB Rus R G Y I TB Rus R
1 0.000 0.996 0.343 0.008 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.982 0.113 0.003 0.000 0.00
2 0.006 0.971 0.304 0.023 0.000 0.044 0.048 0.951 0.198 0.003 0.000 0.01
3 0.019 0.934 0.315 0.023 0.000 0.072 0.092 0.904 0.275 0.003 0.000 0.01
4 0.035 0.898 0.334 0.024 0.000 0.100 0.126 0.857 0.324 0.004 0.000 0.01
5 0.052 0.867 0.351 0.026 0.000 0.124 0.152 0.815 0.353 0.005 0.000 0.02
6 0.068 0.842 0.365 0.028 0.000 0.143 0.172 0.779 0.372 0.006 0.000 0.02
7 0.082 0.822 0.376 0.031 0.000 0.158 0.189 0.750 0.384 0.007 0.000 0.02
8 0.093 0.806 0.385 0.033 0.000 0.170 0.203 0.727 0.393 0.008 0.000 0.02
9 0.104 0.793 0.391 0.035 0.000 0.179 0.214 0.707 0.398 0.008 0.000 0.02
10 0.112 0.783 0.397 0.037 0.000 0.187 0.223 0.691 0.402 0.009 0.000 0.02
…
15 0.140 0.752 0.412 0.044 0.000 0.210 0.253 0.644 0.411 0.010 0.000 0.02
16 0.144 0.748 0.414 0.045 0.000 0.213 0.257 0.639 0.412 0.010 0.000 0.02
17 0.147 0.745 0.416 0.045 0.000 0.215 0.260 0.634 0.413 0.010 0.000 0.02
18 0.149 0.743 0.417 0.046 0.000 0.217 0.263 0.630 0.413 0.011 0.000 0.02
19 0.152 0.740 0.418 0.047 0.000 0.219 0.266 0.627 0.414 0.011 0.000 0.02




Figure 1.39: Variance decomposition at di↵erent horizons (H = 1 : 20): sovereign
rate shocks; calculated based on GMM estimation on the deseasoned data; (1994q1-
2014q4); Npanels = 30;
H G Y I TB Rus R G Y I TB Rus R
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.941 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.934
2 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.014 0.000 0.935 0.001 0.000 0.009 0.003 0.000 0.946
3 0.010 0.001 0.005 0.023 0.000 0.906 0.002 0.000 0.019 0.007 0.000 0.935
4 0.015 0.003 0.009 0.028 0.000 0.874 0.003 0.001 0.028 0.010 0.000 0.920
5 0.019 0.005 0.013 0.030 0.000 0.843 0.003 0.001 0.034 0.012 0.000 0.906
6 0.022 0.008 0.016 0.031 0.000 0.817 0.004 0.002 0.039 0.013 0.000 0.894
7 0.024 0.010 0.018 0.032 0.000 0.793 0.005 0.003 0.042 0.014 0.000 0.884
8 0.026 0.012 0.020 0.033 0.000 0.774 0.005 0.003 0.045 0.015 0.000 0.876
9 0.027 0.014 0.022 0.033 0.000 0.757 0.006 0.004 0.047 0.016 0.000 0.869
10 0.028 0.016 0.024 0.033 0.000 0.743 0.006 0.005 0.049 0.016 0.000 0.864
….
15 0.030 0.021 0.028 0.033 0.000 0.697 0.008 0.007 0.052 0.018 0.000 0.850
16 0.030 0.022 0.029 0.033 0.000 0.691 0.009 0.007 0.052 0.018 0.000 0.848
17 0.031 0.022 0.029 0.033 0.000 0.687 0.009 0.008 0.052 0.018 0.000 0.847
18 0.031 0.023 0.030 0.033 0.000 0.682 0.009 0.008 0.052 0.018 0.000 0.846
19 0.031 0.023 0.030 0.034 0.000 0.679 0.009 0.008 0.052 0.018 0.000 0.845




Figure 1.40: Government consumption shock; Quarterly data (1994q1-2014q4); FE
estimates; bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals based on 10000 simulations; the
sample excludes Portugal, Greece and Italy
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Figure 1.41: Output shock; Quarterly data (1994q1-2014q4); FE estimates; boot-
strapped 95% confidence intervals based on 10000 simulations; the sample excludes
Portugal, Greece and Italy
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Figure 1.42: Sovereign rate shock; Quarterly data (1994q1-2014q4); FE estimates;
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals based on 10000 simulations; the sample ex-
cludes Portugal, Greece and Italy
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Figure 1.43: Eigenvalues of selected matrices
FE:	full	
sample Group Eigen	Values Group Eigen	Values
GMM:	Full	
Sample Group Eigen	Values Group Eigen	Values
EME	=	0 0.3670 EME	=	1 0.462 EME	=	0 0.1239 EME	=	1 0.9397
0.6234 0.915 0.2216 0.1017
0.8096 0.752 0.6426 0.5766
1.0106 0.817 0.9504 0.5766
0.9790 0.627 0.8534 0.4929


















Figure 1.44: Autoregressive coe cient of the government rate; estimates by country
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Chapter 2
Estimating the Dynamics of Fiscal
Financing in Emerging Economies
2.1 Introduction
In this paper I propose a strategy for estimating the government financing rule for an
emerging economy. The estimation uses the structural VAR impulse responses ob-
tained in the previous chapter to discipline the parameters of a small open economy
real business cycle model with a public sector. The parameters can be split into two
groups: those influencing the e↵ectiveness of fiscal policy (i.e the multiplier MGY ) and
the parameters governing the financing of the exogenous stream of government con-
sumption. The empirical response to interest rate shocks puts restrictions on the first
group of parameters governing the size of the multiplier. The empirical response to
a government consumption shock can be used to obtain estimates of the fiscal policy
rule. I construct a model with a role for both interest rate shocks and government
consumption shocks. A natural estimation approach in this case is impulse response
matching.
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A few stylized facts emerge from the analysis in the first chapter. The response of
government consumption expenditure to domestic fundamentals for both developed
and emerging economies is the same. Government consumption expenditure decreases
in response to an interest rate increase in emerging economies. Finally, government
consumption multipliers are lower for emerging economies. This paper focuses on
the last stylized fact and aims to uncover the reasons for the lower multiplier. The
revenue side of government financing is outside of the scope of the empirical chapter.
As revenue data for a panel of countries (particularly the emerging groups) is hard
to obtain, this chapter discusses the use of model based estimates of government fi-
nancing.
The theoretical literature has emphasized the mode of financing for how e↵ective
fiscal expansions are: for instance Gali et al. (2007) in a closed economy context
and Garcia and Restrepo (2007) for a small open economy. Model based estimates
of fiscal policy rules for developed economies using Bayesian techniques exist: for
example Leeper et al. (2010) and references therein and Christo↵el et al. (2011). The
emphasis in this paper is accounting for the feedback between the interest rate and
domestic fundamentals as well as the feedback between government consumption and
the interest rate. The estimation approach is in the spirit of Uribe and Yue (2006).
Figure 2.1 is a stylized summary of their approach; using the estimated e↵ect of
domestic fundamentals on the interest rate, they obtain model based estimates of the
parameters governing the propagation of interest rate shocks. Figure 2.2 schematically
shows my estimation approach. It builds on the intuition that the propagation of both
an interest rate shock and a government consumption shock depends on the same
groups of parameters. Estimating those as a first stage would allow the estimation of
a lump sum financing rule in the second stage. Figure 2.3 summarizes the approach




In this section I adopt the stylized approach in Hall (2009) to demonstrate the key
features of a small open economy model which can meaningfully propagate both in-
terest rate and government consumption shocks. Starting with the closed economy
real business cycle model, this model implies a trade-o↵ between consumption and
output in response to a government consumption shock. While the government con-
sumption multiplier implied by the model is always positive under separable utility,
consumption must fall for output to increase. The increase in the equilibrium level of
labor is solely due to the increase in labor supply. Higher output is the result of higher
labor supply induced by the negative income /wealth e↵ect due to the higher level
of government consumption spending. The stronger the income e↵ect, the higher is
the government spending multiplier on output. However, the fact that consumption
must fall for output to increase guarantees that the government spending multiplier
on output is less than 1.
Counter-cyclical mark-ups remove the trade-o↵ between consumption and output
in a closed economy setting. The labor wedge allows the real wage and labor de-
mand to increase in response to a government consumption shock. While in the real
business cycle model, a bigger decrease in consumption also induces a bigger increase
in the consumption-constant labor supply leading to a higher output multiplier, the
opposite is true in a model which features a labor wedge distortion. Figure 2.4 shows
a stylized representation.
To elucidate, I follow Hall (2009) in specifying a stylized economy in which a
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counter-cyclical labor wedge is introduced in the labor demand schedule. The capital
stock is assumed to be fixed and normalized to 1. The aggregate price level is normal-
ized to 1. The household optimizes: E0
P1
t=0  
tu(ct, ht) subject to wtht+ ⇡t = ct+ gt
i.e period consumption is financed from labor income and the firm’s profit net of
government consumption expenditure. The government runs a balanced budget and
finances lump sum expenditures. Production is yt = h↵t .
1 The aggregate resource
constraint implies that production output goes to household and government con-
sumption. yt = ct + gt. In this simple model:
Labor Demand:
wˆt =  (1  ↵)hˆt
Labor Supply:
















 ⌘ the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply, Fc =
1
  ⌘ the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution.2
Introducing a simple counter-cyclical mark-up resolves the trade-o↵ between con-
sumption and output. As labor demand increases in response to the increase in
aggregate demand, it is possible for both consumption and output to increase in re-
sponse to an increase in government consumption.
While in the perfectly competitive case a larger drop in consumption leads to a
1With capital fixed, the production function exhibits decreasing returns, which generates profits
even in the absence of a labor wedge. Profits are rebated to the household.
2For GHH preferences (commonly used in the SOE literature) uhhuh hˆ =
ucc
uc
c + 1 hˆ and the labor
supply becomes:  wˆ = hˆ.
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high multiplier (MYG ), just the opposite is true in the case of when a labor wedge dis-
tortion is introduced. In this case I assume market power and monopolistic markup
which varies counter-cyclically: P = µ(y)Cy with µ(y) = y !. Recalling that the





















The multiplier is higher for less important decreasing returns to labor (higher ↵),
higher Frisch elasticity and lower   i.e. lower intertemporal elasticity of substitution.










While the multiplier is strictly lower than 1 in the perfectly competitive case, for a
su ciently high mark-up elasticity in the case with a labor wedge, the multiplier can
be higher than 1. For standard parameterization, an elasticity higher than 1.18 is re-
quired for the multiplier to be larger than 1 (figure 2.5). For ! = 0.5, the multiplier is
0.75. This is not substantially di↵erent from the multiplier when ! = 0, which is 0.63.
Figure 2.6 reports the impulse response to a unitary shock to government con-
sumption for three di↵erent levels of the mark-up elasticity. For all three, output
increases. However, in the absence of a labor wedge, the decrease in consumption
which brings about the expansion in output is too large to be supported by empir-
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ical evidence. Increasing the mark-up elasticity decreases / reverses the decrease in
consumption and the wage. In turn, the multiplier increases.
With this intuition in hand, I analyze how the multiplier changes once the house-
hold can borrow from abroad. The period budget constraint becomes: wtht + ⇡t +
bt   Rbt 1 = ct + gt +  (bt). Relaxing the closed economy assumption leads to two
important di↵erences. First, domestic absorption need not equal output and the con-
sumption multiplier is not one minus the output multiplier. Second, up to a negligible
equilibrium inducing portfolio adjustment cost, the household faces a perfectly elastic
supply of loanable funds. Figure 2.7 compares the impulse response of consumption,
hours worked, the wage, output and the multiplier to the same government consump-
tion shock in the closed and in the small open economy case in the absence of a labor
wedge. In terms of the signs of the impulse responses, the same logic transpires in
the SOE: consumption falls, which through the income e↵ect leads to an increase in
hours and output. The multiplier in the SOE case, however, is lower. The drop in
consumption is also smaller, approaching the empirical estimates (Hall (2009) reviews
the empirical literature on the response of consumption to a government shock). Be-
cause the household can borrow from abroad, they can smooth consumption without
increasing labor e↵ort as much as in the closed economy counterpart. For a relatively
smaller increase in labor e↵ort, a much higher level consumption is sustained in the
SOE. In other words part of the negative income e↵ect is o↵set by international bor-
rowing. For this reason, the fall in the real wage is also smaller.
Figure 2.8 explores the e↵ect of the elasticity of the labor wedge on the multi-
plier in the open and in the closed economy variant of the model. For lower values
of the mark-up counter-cyclicality (!  1.03), the SOE multiplier is lower than the
closed economy multiplier. This can be explained with the previous finding that the
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income e↵ect induces a smaller increase in labor e↵ort in the small open economy.
As ! increases, the SOE multiplier approaches the closed economy multiplier. For
! 2 (1.03, 1.04], the SOE multiplier surpasses the closed economy one.
The stylized model suggests that a key model feature for the propagation of gov-
ernment consumption shocks is the behavior of the counter cyclical labor wedge.
Commonly nominal rigidities would be responsible for generating the wedge.3 Gali
et al. (2007) show that price rigidity increases the multiplier and dampens the de-
crease in consumption, but cannot alone lead to a multiplier higher than 1.
The propagation of interest rate shocks also depends on the parameters governing
the labor wedge. Neumeyer and Perri (2005) introduce a working capital constraint
for firms as a propagation mechanism for interest rate shocks. The working capital
constraint introduces a labor wedge analogous to the labor wedge discussed above,
which however depends on the interest rate:
wˆt =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
-↵hˆt if ⌘ = 0
 ⌘(wedge)R Rˆdt   ↵hˆt if ⌘ 6= 0
where ⌘ is the fraction of the wage subject to the working capital constraint.4 To
the extent that output a↵ects the interest rate, this leads again to a counter-cyclical






y is the elasticity of the interest rate to real output. Hevia (2014) estimates
the cyclical behavior of a labor wedge (in addition to four other wedges) and shows
3Bilbiie et al. (2012) is an example of a real model in which countercyclical mark-ups arise because
of product creation.
4I provide more details on introducing the working capital constraint in the next section.
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that the wedges of the estimated prototype economy are consistent with a model with
a working capital and a collateral constraint.
2.3 Model
Below I present a heterogenous agent, small open economy model with a public sec-
tor. The model nests both the cases of distortionary and non-distortionary taxation.
There are two types of households: Ricardian and non-Ricardian. The Ricardian
household has access to a one period, internationally-traded, non-state-contingent
bond while the Non-Ricardian household has no financial means for consumption
smoothing. Following seminal work by Neumeyer and Perri (2005), I impose a work-
ing capital constraint on firms. The firm’s production technology also features a
learning by doing externality. The interest rate on government borrowing is deter-
mined in international financial markets. It is depends on fundamentals and is subject
to unexpected, transitory shocks. This is in keeping with the small open economy
literature emphasis on international borrowing conditions as one of the key drivers of
business cycles in these economies.
A heterogenous agent model is particularly relevant in the context of emerging
economies as a non-negligible share of households having no access to financial mar-
kets is even more plausible for these economies. The model-based Bayesian estimation
results on data from the Philippines reported by Mandelman (2013) put the mean
value for the share of Non-Ricardian households at 62% with a plausible range between
42% and 90%. Using similar methodology, Barrail Halley (2017) reports similar, even
slightly higher estimates of this parameter on data for Mexico with the mean of the
posterior distribution at 75%.
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2.3.1 Ricardians
There is a continuum of infinitely-lived Ricardian households. The mass of these







where   is the discount factor, hR and cR are total hours worked and consumption
respectively for a Ricardian household.
Each Ricardian household faces the following resource constraint in period t:
(1  ⌧t)wthRt + dRkt + dRt = (1 + ⌧ ct )cRt + zRt +Rt 1dRt 1 + (1  ) (dRt )
Variables with an R superscript denote quantities describing a Ricardian household.
Income for this household consists of payments to labor, where the real wage is de-
noted by wt, dividend payments denoted by dRkt, which are rebated to the Ricardian
household by a perfectly competitive capital goods firm and the household’s borrow-
ing dRt in the form of one period non state contingent debt. These assets are used for
consumption, paying down the previous period’s debt or extracted by the government
as a lump sum tax zt > 0 (or a lump sum transfer zt < 0). Each household is subject
to the weighted portfolio adjustment costs  (dRt ). As is standard in the small open
economy literature, a small quadratic portfolio adjustment cost is included simply
as a stationarity inducing device as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003b). Ricardian
households borrow at the Rt gross interest rate. The government levies taxes on labor
income ⌧t and on consumption ⌧ ct . The tax levied on capital income is paid by the
capital goods firm. Finally   is the discount factor for both the Ricardian and the
non-Ricardian household.
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The implied first order conditions for the Ricardian households are:

















1 + ⌧ ct t
dt is the private sector debt as defined in the aggregation section. The interpre-
tation of these conditions is as follows. The first condition denotes the Ricardian
household labor supply and equates the marginal disutility of labor e↵ort to the
after-tax utility value of the wage rate. The second condition is the asset pricing
relationship for the Ricardian household. The condition also defines the economy-
wide interest rate Rdt =
Rt
1  0(dt) . Finally, the third condition equates the marginal
utility of wealth to the marginal utility of consumption with ⌧ ct increasing the shadow
value of real income. It is clear from the first order conditions that when ⌧ ct 6=  ⌧t,
the taxes distort the marginal rate of transformation. The model also features a tax
on capital returns paid by the capital goods firm. Coleman (2000) shows that tax-
ing consumption and subsidizing labor at the same, constant rate is optimal in the
context of a dynamic closed economy model with capital and a complete set of tax
instruments. The result generalizes the uniform taxation principle to the dynamic
setting that all final goods (consumption and leisure) should be taxed at the same
rate. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003a) provides examples why this need not be the
case for a small open economy due to the household’s access to international financial
markets. The focus of this study is a positive analysis of fiscal financing; establishing
the optimal tax policy is outside the scope the paper.
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2.3.2 Non-Ricardians
The rest of the households with mass  in the economy are Non-Ricardians. The







The face the following budget constraint:
(1  ⌧t)wthNRt = (1 + ⌧ ct )cNRt + zNRt
Non-Ricardian households face the same tax rates as the Ricardians. However,
Non-Ricardians have no access to financial or capital markets to borrow or save in
i.e. they consume their income in a hand-to-mouth fashion. Hence they solve only
an intra-temporal allocation problem defining their labor supply schedule:






(1 + ⌧ ct )
wt
As a natural modeling approach, I assume that the government does not di↵er-
entiate between Ricardian and Non-Ricardian households in terms of taxes and sets
the same labor and consumption tax across both types of households. In the same
way, when revenue is lump sum financed, zˆNRt = zˆ
R
t in deviations from the model’s
steady state. I allow for di↵erences in the steady state level of the lump sum tax /
transfer to ensure the same level of steady state consumption and hours worked for
the both households.
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2.3.3 Capital Goods Firm
A perfectly competitive capital goods firm owns the capital stock and maximizes the




Mt{(1  ⌧ kt )utkt   it}
⌧ kt is the tax rate on capital returns and Mt =  
t t is the shadow value of income
for the Ricardian households. The capital stock accumulation is standard:
kt+1 = (1   )kt +  ( it
kt
)kt
The first order conditions for the capital goods firm are:
  1 + qt i( it
kt
)kt = 0




The first order conditions recover conventional results from the q-theory of invest-
ment. qt is the shadow value of capital. As the model features a single good economy
whose price is normalized to 1, marginal q would be also 1 in the absence of capital
adjustment costs.5
5Recasting the firm’s problem as a Bellman equation:
v(kt; ✏t) = maxit{rtkt   it    (it, kt) +  EtMt,t+1v(it + (1   )kt, ✏t+1)}
optimality requires:
v1(kt; ✏t) = rt   @ (it,kr)@kt +  (1   )EtMt,t+1v1(kt+1; ✏t+1)
 1  @ (it,kt)@it +  EtMt,t+1v1(kt+1; ✏t+1) = 0
combining the two equations:





2.3.4 Consumption Good Firm
The consumption good firm faces a working capital constraint. It is required to hold
a fraction of its wage bill in the form of non-interest-bearing securities: &t   ⌘wtht. It
is optimal that the constraint binds. The firm can also borrow at the economy-wide







Mt{F (kt, ht) wtht   utkt   ⌘wtht + ⌘wt 1ht 1 + dft  Rdt dft 1}
Mt =  t t is the discount factor for the firm.
Capital and labor demand schedules are defined below:
ut = Fk(kt, ht)




As shown in Uribe and Yue (2006) in equilibrium dft = &t and ⇡t = 0.






















qt =  EtMt,t+1v1(kt+1; ✏t+1) = 1 +
@ (it,kt)
@it
is the marginal value of capital i.e the marginal
benefit of increasing the stock Kt+1. Hayashi: under regularity assumptions qt = Qt. Then:








is managerial capital. Based on Garcia-Cicco and
Kawamura (2015), µa = 0.6 and ⇣ is a parameter to be estimated. The assumed
functional form implies: aˆt = (1  µa)
P
i=0(µ
a)iyˆt i 1 The firm does not internalize
the externality and the fact that in equilibrium yt = y¯t. This friction has been used in
the literature on Dutch disease. A few examples include Garcia-Cicco and Kawamura
(2015), Lama and Medina (2012) and Magud and Sosa (2010).
2.3.5 The Public Sector
The government must finance a stream of unproductive consumption gt with tax
revenue and borrowing in international financial markets. The budget constraint for
the government is:
gt = zt + ⌧
c
t ct + ⌧
k
t utkt + ⌧twtht + bt  Rgt 1bt 1
ct , kt, ht are aggregate levels of consumption, capital and hours worked. bt denotes
the stock of one period risk-free government debt issued in international financial
markets.
The choice of financing for the government is rule-based.
FVt = Zyt 1 + ⌅bt 1 + ⇢FVt 1 +  et
FVt is a vector of fiscal variables expressed in deviations from the steady state. Z,
⌅ and ⇢,   are coe cient matrices, et is a vector of serially uncorrelated Standard















In the case of distortionary taxation, it is reasonable to allow for cross correlations
in the taxes shock matrix: 6
⇢ =
266666664
⇢g 0 0 0
0 ⇢kk ⇢kl ⇢kc
0 ⇢kl ⇢ll ⇢lc
0 ⇢kc ⇢lc ⇢cc
377777775










6Leeper et al. (2010) specify and estimate a shock process for the US, in which a reduced form
tax shock depends on a linear combination of its own shocks as well as the shocks to the other taxes.
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Combining the government constraint and the financing rule (and setting ⇢g and
⇢z to 0), the following equation determines the evolution of government debt:
bt = (Zg   Zrev +Rgt 1)bt 1 + (⌅g   ⌅rev +Rgt 1)yt 1 +  get
For stability it is required that Zg   Zrev +Rgt 1 < 1.
2.3.6 Aggregation
I require that the following aggregation relationships hold:
ct =  c
R
t + (1   )cNRt
ht =  h
R
t + (1   )hNRt
(1   )dRt = dt
(1   )dRkt = dkt
The trade balance and net foreign lending are:




bt 1) = dt + bt + tbt
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2.3.7 Borrowing Costs and Shocks
The steady-state rate for the private (R = Rf ) and public (Rg) sector are parameter-
ized. Outside of the model’s non-stochastic steady state, the government borrowing
rate is determined by the estimated coe cients of the SVAR model.
Estimates for the Emerging Group
Rgt = 0.017Gt   0.078Yt   0.036INVt + 0.091TBYt   0.347Rust +
0.001Gt 1   0.055Yt 1 + 0.032INVt 1   0.069tbyt 1 + 0.233Rust 1 + 0.628Rt 1 +  rert
Estimates for the Developed Group
Rgt = 0.003Gt   0.055Yt   0.046INVt   0.021TBYt   0.033Rust +
0.007Gt 1   0.03Yt 1 + 0.013INVt 1   0.007TBYt 1   0.005Rust 1 + 0.804Rt 1 +  rert
The response of the rate for the Ricardians is determined by the pass-through to
the private sector: Rt = µrR
g
t . Akinci (2013) and Arteta and Hale (2008) provide
estimates of µr.
2.4 Discussion
The model provides a flexible way to switch between distortionary and non-distortionary
taxation by either setting ⌧ kt = ⌧
c
t = ⌧t = 0 or zt = z¯
i. While more realistic, distor-
tionary taxation increases the number of parameters to be estimated. Additionally, it
might be impossible to identify those without data on individual tax revenue compo-
nents. Leeper et al. (2010) provide estimates of the tax rates shock cross-correlation
matrix ⇢ based on the US.
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The specified model does not feature any nominal frictions as I have aimed to
specify as stylized a model as possible. A model with nominal frictions as in Gertler
et al. (2007) and Mandelman (2013) would also introduce a counter-cyclical labor
wedge and make the economy sensitive to both interest rate fluctuations and gov-
ernment consumption spending. The challenge in this setting is specifying a realistic
monetary policy rule for an emerging economy. Mandelman (2013) estimates a small
open economy model on data from the Philippines with Bayesian methods and ob-
tains estimates for an open economy version of the Taylor rule which smooths the
nominal interest rate, inflation, the nominal exchange rate and the output gap.
2.5 Estimation Strategy
There are 10 parameters of interest: ✓ = [⌘    ⇣ Zg Zrev ⌅g ⌅rev ⇢gg ⇢rev] in the lump
sum taxation case. ⌘ is the fraction of the wage subject to a working capital constraint,
  is capital adjustment cost,  is the fraction of non-Ricardian consumers, ⇣ governs
the importance of the learning by doing externality in the production function, Z and
⌅ are the response of fiscal variable to output and debt and ⇢ is the autocorrelation of
fiscal variables. The parameter space can be further reduced if the SVAR estimates
for [Zg ⇢gg] are used and eliminating the shocks to revenue. Then the parameters to be
estimated are: ✓ = [⌘    ⇣ Zrev ⌅g ⌅rev]. An estimation approach which utilizes the
impulse responses obtained in the previous chapter is to perform an impulse response
matching exercise as in Garcia-Cicco and Kawamura (2015), Uribe and Yue (2006)
among others. In this exercise, ✓ minimizes the following criterion:
min✓ˆ[IR
e   IRm(✓ˆ)]0⌃ 1IRe [IRe   IRm(✓ˆ)]
where IRe are the estimated impulse responses and Rm(✓) are the model generated
responses.
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In what follows I illustrate the key features of the model and how they relate to
the estimation approach. For the impulse response analysis I have set  = 0 and
introduced preferences with external habit formation (Abel (1990)). The model is
summarized in the appendix. Figure 2.9 reports the impulse response to an interest
rate shock with and without a working capital constraint. In both cases the interest
rate shock is contractionary. Due to the wealth e↵ect, consumption, investment and
output decrease. In the absence of a working capital constraint, the impact response
of labor demand is nil. In the following periods, depressed demand reduces output,
the real wage and hours worked. Once the working capital constraint is imposed,
setting ⌘ = 0.5, labor demand responds on impact. The overall response of labor de-
mand is magnified. This leads the response of consumption to the interest rate shock
to more than double relative to the case when ⌘ = 0. Due to the capital adjustment
costs, ⌘ has little bearing on the response of investment and the trade balance. Fig-
ure 2.10 reports the impulse responses to a range of values for ⌘.
The exercise illustrates the importance of ⌘ for the magnitude of the response of
output. Whether the labor wedge introduced through a working capital constraint
can respond to government consumption shocks depends on the strength of the feed-
back from output to the real rate. Figure 2.13 reports the impulse responses to an
interest rate shock with and without a feedback from fundamentals to the real rate.
Although, the feedback increases the overall sensitivity of the model variables to an
interest rate shock, the overall di↵erence is admittedly small. To reinforce the sensi-
tivity of the labor wedge to shocks other than those to the interest rate, I introduce
a learning by doing externality.
Figures 2.11 and 2.12 show the impulse response of model variables to an inter-
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est rate shock under di↵erent parameter values for habit (µ) and capital adjustment
costs ( ). The exercise is instructive in terms of the household’s ability to adjust
consumption and investment in the face of a wealth shock. When capital adjustment
costs are high, most of the variation is absorbed by the adjustment cost itself. Out-
side of the trade balance and investment,   matters for the convergence of output
and consumption. The external habit formation parameter, on the other hand, pre-
dominantly influences the consumption-saving decision and the stock of debt with a
meaningful, but relatively short lived e↵ect on consumption and the trade balance.
2.6 Future work
Obtaining estimates of the government financing rule for emerging economies will
allow the construction of counterfactual government consumption multipliers under
alternative financing rules. Such counterfactual exercises will shed light on how much
debt intolerance as coined by Reinhart et al. (2003) limits the scope of fiscal pol-
icy in emerging economies. Counterfactual financing can also quantify the e↵ect on
aggregate volatility and the welfare implications of alternative financing rules.
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2.7 Figures









Uribe and Yue (2006): estimation strategy




Stage 1: obtain model based 
estimates
Parameters from Stage 1 
determine G effectiveness
Stage 2: obtain model based 
estimates of government financing 
Identification Strategy 
(the case of lump sump financing)
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model based estimates (Demand shock)
(Demand Shock)
model based estimates of 
government financing 
Identification Strategy 
(the case of distortionary taxation)
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Figure 2.4: Schematic representation of the labor market in a closed economy model
!(y)
Real wage Real wage
Real wageReal wage
Hours worked Hours worked
















Figure 2.5: Parameterization and implied parameter values in the closed economy
stylized model
Parameters Meaning high omega low omega no mark up
gam labor disutility weight 1.10
xi complemetarity (c and h) -
sigma IES 0.50
alpha decreasing returns to labor 0.70
psi labor Frisch elasticity 1.90
omega mark up elasticity to output 1.18 0.50 0.00
m(dy/dg) multiplier 1.00 0.75 0.63
SEPARABE UTILITY
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Figure 2.6: Impulse response to a government consumption shock in the closed econ-
omy




































Figure 2.7: Impulse response to a government consumption shock in the closed econ-
omy
C H W Y MYG
impact -0.27 0.88 -0.20 0.63 0.63
t=12 -0.11 0.34 -0.08 0.24 0.63
t=24 -0.02 0.08 -0.02 0.06 0.63
C H W Y MYG
impact -0.08 0.26 -0.06 0.19 0.19
t=12 -0.07 0.25 -0.06 0.18 0.28





Figure 2.8: Government consumption shock: closed versus open economy


























Figure 2.9: Introducing a working capital constraint








































































Figure 2.10: Sensitivity to ⌘






































































Figure 2.11: Sensitivity to the capital adjustment cost  













































































Figure 2.12: Sensitivity to habit formation µ











































































Figure 2.13: Sensitivity to feedback










































































 tu(ct   µ ˜ct 1, ht)
such that
1.
wtht + utkt + dt  Rt 1dt 1   (dt) = ct + it
2.




uc(ct   µ ˜ct 1, ht+1)   t = 0
ht
uh(ct   µ ˜ct 1, ht) + Et twt = 0
kt+1
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qt = 1 if capital adjustment is 0. Writing out the condition explicitly: 1 =
qt(1  '( itkt    )). q = 1 evaluated at the steady state.
The firm FOC-s are the same.
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